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FAILURE TO CAPTURE: WHY BUSINESS DOES NOT CONTROL 
THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 
GABRIEL SCHEFFLER* 
ABSTRACT 
Leading figures on both the political right and the political left have 
concluded that the agency rulemaking process is captured: that it serves to 
benefit businesses, at the expense of the general public.  This perception ap-
pears to be supported by recent theoretical and empirical scholarship and 
has prompted lawmakers to introduce various proposals to reform the fed-
eral rulemaking process. 
Yet as I will demonstrate in this Article, the view of the rulemaking pro-
cess as captured is unwarranted.  I will show that the academic literature 
actually provides little guidance as to the magnitude of business influence—
that is, the extent to which businesses are able to achieve their desired regu-
latory outcomes.  Drawing on an extensive and original empirical investiga-
tion of the Tank Car Rule, a major rule issued by the Department of Trans-
portation in 2015, I will uncover several key limitations on business influence 
in the rulemaking process.  Taken together, these limitations show that busi-
nesses do not routinely exert anything approaching systematic control over 
the federal rulemaking process. 
This conclusion undercuts two prominent concerns associated with the 
capture account of regulation by showing that the regulatory process may 
still serve the public interest, and by defusing a possible threat to the demo-
cratic legitimacy of agency rules.  In addition, it provides reason to disfavor 
major reforms to the rulemaking process, and suggests that some proposed 
reforms could even have the opposite effect and serve to augment business 
influence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A growing chorus of prominent voices on both the political right and 
the political left have concluded that interest groups have captured the ad-
ministrative state.  For instance, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse has written that 
“agency capture is . . . a threat to the integrity of government,”1 and warned 
that the “ever-deepening reach of corporate interests into our environmental 
regulator will have consequences for this generation and those to come.”2  
Similarly, Senator Mike Lee has stated that “regulatory capture is one of the 
most pressing political, economic, and moral issues of our time.”3  Observers 
have attributed a number of recent catastrophes—ranging from the Great Re-
cession of 2008 to the BP oil spill—to such regulatory capture.4 
Much of this criticism has focused in particular on the role that interest 
groups—and more specifically, businesses—play in the administrative rule-
making process: the process by which federal administrative agencies issue 
                                                          
 1.  Sheldon Whitehouse, How Government Can Root Out Regulatory Capture, REGULATORY 
REV. (June 15, 2016), https://www.theregreview.org/2016/06/15/whitehouse-how-government-
can-root-out-regulatory-capture/. 
 2.  Sheldon Whitehouse, The Corporate Capture of EPA, MEDIUM (Oct. 4, 2017), https://me-
dium.com/@senwhitehouse/the-corporate-capture-of-epa-7e2652624c84. 
 3.  Mike Lee, Fighting Regulatory Capture in the 21st Century, REGULATORY REV. (Jun. 16, 
2016), https://www.theregreview.org/2016/06/16/lee-fighting-regulatory-capture-in-the-21st-cen-
tury/. 
 4.  Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, Introduction to PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: 
SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 1 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 
2014). 
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regulations.5  Senator Elizabeth Warren has written that “[w]hen it comes to 
undue industry influence, our rulemaking process is broken from start to fin-
ish.”6  The rulemaking process is, of course, enormously consequential: For 
decades, the vast majority of federal laws have been issued by administrative 
agencies, and interest groups consider participating in administrative rule-
making to be as important, or more important, than lobbying Congress.7  Un-
der the regulatory capture view, businesses control the rulemaking process, 
with the result that regulation serves primarily to benefit them at the expense 
of the general public.8 
In response, government policymakers have increasingly investigated 
allegations of regulatory capture and proposed various reforms to the rule-
making process in order to reduce capture.9  For example, Senator Warren 
has introduced a bill which would, among other things, impose additional 
disclosure requirements, install a public advocate into the regulatory process, 
and prevent the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) from 
                                                          
 5.   This Article follows Professors Cornelius Kerwin and Scott Furlong’s definition of inter-
est groups, which includes “companies, business and trade associations, unions, other levels of gov-
ernment, and . . . public interest groups.”  CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, 
RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 189 (4th ed. 2011).  
However, I use slightly different terminology: I use the term businesses to refer to individual firms, 
industry associations to refer to organizations that represent groups of businesses, and business 
interests to refer to both individual businesses and industry associations.  
 6.  Elizabeth Warren, Corporate Capture of the Rulemaking Process, REGULATORY REV. 
(June 14, 2016), https://www.theregreview.org/2016/06/14/warren-corporate-capture-of-the-rule-
making-process. 
 7.  Scott R. Furlong, Interest Group Influence on Rule Making, 29 ADMIN. & SOC. 325, 333–
334 (1997); Scott R. Furlong & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Interest Group Participation in Rulemaking: 
A Decade of Change, J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 353, 360 (2004). 
 8.  See Carpenter & Moss, supra note 4, at 13 (defining regulatory capture as “the result or 
process by which regulation, in law or application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away from 
the public interest and toward the interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and action of the 
industry itself”); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, 
and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 169 (1990) (defining the 
“capture” theory of regulation as the notion that “government regulation reflects the influence of 
special interests, and is created and operated for their advantage”).  
 9.  See, e.g., Regulatory Capture Prevention Act of 2011, S. 1338, 112th Cong. (2011); Pro-
tecting the Public Interest: Understanding the Threat of Agency Capture: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Admin. Oversight & the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010); 
Protecting the Public Interest: Understanding the Threat of Agency Capture, COMMITTEE ON THE 
JUDICIARY (Aug. 3, 10:00 AM) https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/protecting-the-public-
interest-understanding-the-threat-of-agency-capture (providing a video of the Senate Subcommittee 
Hearing and prepared written statements of witnesses); see also Jonathan Spicer, Exclusive: U.S. 
Watchdog to Probe Fed’s Lax Oversight of Wall Street, REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.reu-
ters.com/article/us-usa-fed-probe-exclusive-idUSKCN0W62C0 (“Ranking representatives Maxine 
Waters of the House Financial Services Committee and Al Green of the Subcommittee on Oversight 
and Investigations asked the Government Accountability Office on Oct. 8 to launch a probe of ‘reg-
ulatory capture’ and to focus on the New York Fed, according to a letter obtained by Reuters.”). 
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communicating with non-executive branch officials.10  Meanwhile, in 2017, 
the then-Republican-controlled House of Representatives passed the Regula-
tions from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act (“REINS Act”), which 
would require Congress to affirmatively approve most new major regula-
tions, subjecting them to the same process as legislation.11  Proponents of the 
REINS Act have argued that putting more decision-making authority in the 
hands of Congress would (perhaps counter-intuitively) curb interest group 
influence by rendering the regulatory process more subject to public scru-
tiny.12 
At first glance, a burgeoning body of empirical research in law and po-
litical science appears to support the view that the rulemaking process has 
been captured.  This research consistently finds that businesses dispropor-
tionately participate in the rulemaking process, and some research even pur-
ports to show that this disproportionate participation by business leads to 
greater influence over the content of the rules that agencies issue.13  At the 
                                                          
 10.  Anti-Corruption and Public Integrity Act, S. 3357, 115th Cong. §§ 306, 309 (2018). 
 11.  Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017, H.R. 26, 115th Cong. § 3 
(2017). 
 12.  See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Placing “Reins” on Regulations: Assessing the Proposed 
REINS Act, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 32 (2013) (“The primary effect of the REINS Act 
would . . . [be] to ensure that those major regulations adopted are those that can command majority 
legislative support, not merely those that are endorsed by concentrated or highly motivated inter-
ests . . . .”); Lee, supra note 3 (“One of the unintended—but indisputable—consequences of Con-
gress recasting itself as the backseat driver of American government has been to move the bulk of 
lawmaking into the bureaucracy, where the opaque and highly technical decision-making process 
facilitates regulatory capture by concentrated interests.”); John W. York, REINS Act Opposition 
Displays Contempt for Consent of the Governed, FEDERALIST (Mar. 17, 2017), http://thefederal-
ist.com/2017/03/17/reins-act-opposition-displays-contempt-consent-governed/ (“By requiring con-
gressional approval for major regulations, the REINS Act threatens this arrangement.  If passed, it 
will cut special interests’ influence, leaving them to fight for Congress’s attention and the public’s 
approval.”).  Even some policymakers who do not support the REINS Act have echoed the idea that 
the rulemaking process’s lack of transparency renders it more susceptible to interest group influence 
than the legislative process.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator from Mass., Tilting the 
Scales: Corporate Capture of the Rulemaking Process, Remarks at the Administrative Conference 
of the United States: Regulatory Capture Forum 1–2 (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.acus.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/2016-3-3_Warren_ACUS_Speech.pdf (“The tilt in Congress is pretty much 
out there for everyone to see. . . . But corporate influence works its magic even better in the shad-
ows—and that’s where rulemaking occurs.”). 
 13.  See, e.g., Simon F. Haeder & Susan Webb Yackee, Influence and the Administrative Pro-
cess: Lobbying the U.S. President’s Office of Management and Budget, 109 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
507 (2015); Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empir-
ical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99 (2011); William F. West 
& Connor Raso, Who Shapes the Rulemaking Agenda? Implications for Bureaucratic Responsive-
ness and Bureaucratic Control, 23 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 495 (2013); Jason Webb Yackee 
& Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. 
Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128 (2006); Susan Webb Yackee, Reconsidering Agency Capture During 
Regulatory Policymaking, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE 
AND HOW TO LIMIT IT, supra note 4, at 292 [hereinafter Yackee, Reconsidering Agency Capture]; 
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same time, a resurgence in theoretical scholarship about regulatory capture 
has brought attention to structural features of the federal regulatory system 
that may cause even well-intentioned regulators to favor business interests 
over public interest groups and individual members of the public.14 
This Article will argue that the view of the rulemaking process as cap-
tured is not warranted—that the rulemaking process is not “broken.”  It will 
show that although recent scholarship finds that businesses participate more 
and exert more influence in the rulemaking process than other types of inter-
est groups, there are still important unresolved questions about the magnitude 
of business influence in the rulemaking process.  Neither the theoretical lit-
erature on agency capture nor the empirical literature on interest group influ-
ence in the rulemaking process demonstrates that businesses routinely control 
regulatory outcomes, nor does this literature undercut the possibility that 
agencies for the most part are able to pursue public interested regulations in 
the face of industry pressure. 
This Article will uncover several important limitations on business in-
fluence through an in-depth empirical case study of the “Tank Car Rule,” a 
major safety regulation promulgated by the Department of Transportation 
(“DOT”) in 2015 that aimed to increase the safety of flammable liquids 
shipped by rail.  Drawing on an original analysis of thousands of public sub-
missions to DOT during the Tank Car Rule rulemaking process, as well as 
interviews with officials and interest group representatives involved in this 
process, I uncover four key reasons why businesses have less influence than 
the existing evidence suggests.  First, even when business interests are in 
general agreement that they would like the rule to be less stringent overall, 
they differ on important issues on a given rule.  Second, even when the over-
all stringency of a rule shifts in the direction that business interests generally 
desire, they still are unlikely to receive their full desired changes.  Third, ex-
amining businesses interests’ influence at specific stages of the rulemaking 
process—most notably, the notice-and-comment period—likely overstates 
their influence on the rule as a whole.  Fourth, by several measures, business 
interests make more limited and realistic requests during the notice-and-com-
ment period than individual members of the public and public interest groups. 
                                                          
Susan Webb Yackee, The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying: Pre-Proposal Agenda Building and Block-
ing during Agency Rulemaking, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 373 (2012) [hereinafter Yackee, 
The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying]; Andrei A. Kirilenko, Shawn Mankad & George Michailidis, 
Do U.S. Financial Regulators Listen to the Public? Testing the Regulatory Process with the Re-
gRank Algorithm (Robert H. Smith School Research Paper, 2014). 
 14.  See, e.g., James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING 
REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT, supra note 4, at 
71; Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L. 
J. 1321 (2010). 
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Together, these findings suggest that we cannot infer from the existing 
evidence that businesses have captured the federal rulemaking process—that 
it serves primarily to benefit their interests at the expense of the general pub-
lic.  This conclusion in turn insulates the regulatory system against two prom-
inent concerns associated with the regulatory capture view of the rulemaking 
process: that the regulatory system fails to serve the public interest and that 
it lacks democratic legitimacy. 
First, the conclusion that the regulatory capture view of the rulemaking 
process is unwarranted suggests that our regulatory system may well still 
serve the public interest.  Although many people might reasonably be dis-
turbed by the evidence that businesses exert disproportionate influence over 
regulations, this evidence alone does not demonstrate that our regulatory sys-
tem is primarily benefiting businesses at the expense of the general public.  
For instance, Professors Daniel Carpenter and David Moss speculate that the 
existing level of business influence is likely making our regulatory system 
worse than it otherwise would be, but they speculate that we are still better 
off with the system we have than we would be without any regulation.15  Sev-
eral scholars have gone further, arguing that greater business influence can 
in some circumstances lead to better regulatory outcomes overall, for exam-
ple, by encouraging businesses to provide agencies with better information 
or by creating a powerful political constituency for new regulations.16 
Second, this conclusion also helps to insulate the regulatory system 
against the concern that rulemaking lacks democratic legitimacy.  Agency 
rules’ legitimacy derives not only from Congress’s passage of their authoriz-
ing legislation, but also from the public’s effective participation in the ad-
ministrative process.17  By the same token, the perceptions that the public has 
been prevented from participating in regulatory decisions, or that such par-
ticipation is ineffectual, serve to undermine agency rules’ legitimacy.18  To 
                                                          
 15.  Carpenter & Moss, supra note 4, at 11–12.  
 16.  See, e.g., Laurence Tai, Harnessing Industry Influence, 68 ADMIN L. REV. 1 (2016) (argu-
ing we should aim to encourage—rather than discourage—industry influence over regulations in 
order to incentivize industry to provide more information to agencies); David Thaw, Enlightened 
Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329 (2014) (examining a case where regulatory capture by 
an advisory committee comprising private interests advanced public goals); Matthew Wansley, Vir-
tuous Capture, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 419 (2015) (arguing there are some cases in which regulatory 
capture serves to advance the public interest). 
 17.  See, e.g., KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 5, at 168 (“The legitimacy of the rulemaking 
process is clearly linked to public participation.”); Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 7, at 354 (“The 
legitimacy of rules is derived from two sources, with the first being the authorizing statutes noted 
above.  The second source of legitimacy is the process by which unelected officials develop the 
rules. . . . [T]he most important procedural element is the central, indeed indispensable, role of pub-
lic participation in the development of rules.  Public participation serves, in effect, as a substitute 
for the electoral process that bestows constitutional legitimacy on legislation.”). 
 18.  Reeve T. Bull, Making the Administrative State “Safe for Democracy”: A Theoretical and 
Practical Analysis of Citizen Participation in Agency Decisionmaking, 65 ADMIN. L. REV 611, 615 
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the extent that businesses do in fact control regulations, agency rulemaking 
would appear to lack legitimacy; yet to the extent that businesses do not exert 
such control, this source of legitimacy would seem to remain intact. 
In addition, this conclusion has important implications for how to im-
prove the regulatory process to limit excessive interest group influence.  If it 
were in fact the case that businesses primarily controlled the regulatory pro-
cess, then that might warrant deregulating or radically restructuring our reg-
ulatory regime.19  Of course, even if business interests do not control the rule-
making process, one may still reasonably be concerned that they have too 
many advantages relative to other interest groups and individuals and that 
reforms are necessary to level the playing field.20  But such a conclusion 
would seem to justify more incremental reforms, rather than radically restruc-
turing the process by which agencies issue rules. 
Part I will describe the theory of regulatory capture and how this theory 
has evolved, review the empirical literature on interest group participation 
and influence in the rulemaking process, and explore what questions still re-
main unanswered.  Part II will describe the Tank Car Rule and the case study 
methodology, and explore several limitations of interest group influence on 
the formulation of this rule.  Part III will examine the implications for the 
utility of the regulatory system, for its democratic legitimacy, and for regu-
latory reform. 
All this is not to deny that there are problems with the federal regulatory 
system or that businesses wield important influence in the development of 
regulations.  One important caveat is that while this study focuses only on 
business interests’ direct participation and influence in the rulemaking pro-
cess, businesses have numerous other tools at their disposal to influence reg-
ulatory policy.  For example, “[b]usiness interests can persuade members of 
                                                          
(2013) (“[W]idespread antipathy towards administrative agencies may also reflect a sense that the 
public has been foreclosed from making decisions regarding the proper allocation of resources, de-
cisions that instead are made by relatively insulated bureaucrats remote from mechanisms of dem-
ocratic accountability and unaware of citizens’ preferences.” (footnote omitted)); Carpenter & 
Moss, supra note 4, at 5 (“Public trust in the Federal government has slid ever lower over the last 
forty years and as of this writing, stands at under 20%.  To the extent that assumptions about regu-
latory capture contribute to such fatalism, it is incumbent on us to move beyond simplified theories 
and carefully explore special interest influence with a closer eye on practice.”). 
 19.  Judge Richard Posner implies that such a prescription may have been warranted in the late 
1970s, when industry-specific regulatory agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission 
and the Civil Aeronautics Board were deregulated.  Richard Posner, The Concept of Regulatory 
Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO 
LIMIT IT, supra note 4, at 75; see also Carpenter & Moss, supra note 4, at 5 (“All too frequently, 
moreover, casual claims of capture are associated with demands that the regulatory policy or agency 
in question be not merely reformed but abandoned.”). 
 20.  See, e.g., Bull, supra note 18, at 627–28 (arguing that more balanced participation in the 
rulemaking process will result in agencies receiving more accurate information and a “sense of 
investedness on the part of public participants”). 
 
2020] FAILURE TO CAPTURE 707 
Congress to pressure agencies not to regulate or adopt weak regulations, and 
can influence the White House to appoint administrators hostile to an 
agency’s mission.”21  Business interests may also wield influence through the 
“revolving door” between regulated industries and government positions.22  
There are numerous examples of business interests using these tools to their 
own advantage.23 
Yet by painting an exaggerated portrait of these problems, the capture 
account risks further undermining public trust in government and leading to 
unnecessary or unwise regulatory reforms, some of which could even aug-
ment business influence in the regulatory process.  In a legal system that re-
lies on regulations as a principal source for ordering business activity, under-
standing the nature and extent of business influence is essential to deciding 
whether—and how—to reform the regulatory system. 
I.  THEORIES AND EVIDENCE OF INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE 
A.  Regulatory Capture and Its Progeny 
The modern literature on interest group influence in the administrative 
rulemaking process has been shaped by, and to a large extent reflects, the 
theory of regulatory capture.24  The scholarly literature on regulatory capture 
dates back to the early 1950s (and its intellectual antecedents go back much 
further),25 but it gained prominence with the ascendance of the Chicago 
school of economics, and in particular with George Stigler’s influential 1971 
essay, The Theory of Economic Regulation.26  In his essay, Stigler famously 
                                                          
 21.  Sidney A. Shapiro, The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: Diagnosis, Causality, and Re-
mediation, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 221, 226 (2012); see also Wendy E. Wagner, Holding 
Tight to the Reigns in Harnessing Industry Influence: A Comment on Professor Laurence Tai, 2 
ADMIN. L. REV. ACCORD 1, 8 (2016) (“[I]n regulatory practice, there are other venues for altering 
regulatory outcomes; informing the agency is only one of them.”). 
 22.  Rafael Gely & Asghar Zardkoohi, Measuring the Effects of Post-Government-Employment 
Restrictions, 3 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 288, 300 (2001).  
 23.  Jesse Drucker & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Trump Administration is Relaxing Oversight of 
Nursing Homes, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/14/busi-
ness/trump-administration-nursing-homes.html (outlining how the Trump Administration has 
weakened nursing home regulations following “intense lobbying by the nursing home industry”).  
 24.  Bull, supra note 18, at 627–28 (“[T]he process is often skewed to favor more organized 
interests that can marshal the resources to lobby the agencies more effectively.” (first citing George 
J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971), then citing 
John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 725–
26 (1986))). 
 25.  William J. Novak, A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture, in PREVENTING 
REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT, supra note 4, at 
28. 
 26.  Christopher Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, Capturing Regulatory Reality: Stigler’s The The-
ory of Economic Regulation 1 (Penn Law Faculty Scholarship Paper 1650, 2016). 
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posited that regulation is a product subject to the laws of supply and demand, 
and that as a result of these market forces, “as a rule, regulation is acquired 
by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.”27 
Unlike previous theories, which largely assumed that regulators try to 
act in the interest of the general public, the standard version of the “capture” 
account assumes that regulators act in their own material self-interest.28  At 
the same time, concentrated interests such as businesses are in a better posi-
tion than other interest groups to advance their own interests through the reg-
ulatory process because they have more at stake in most regulatory issues and 
are well-organized; by contrast, groups that aim to promote the general pub-
lic’s interests are less influential because the individuals they represent usu-
ally have less at stake and are harder to organize.29  In combination, these 
two factors are supposed to explain how businesses control the regulatory 
process.30 
In the capture account, businesses may exert influence through several 
potential channels.  Initially, capture theorists proposed that capture operated 
through an “iron triangle,” in which industries lobbied Congress to exert pres-
sure on agencies through legislation or oversight.31  Subsequent scholarship 
explored other means by which industry may motivate regulators to act in its 
interest: such as offering explicit “quid pro quo” arrangements or creating 
more tacit incentives such as the possibility of future employment in the reg-
ulated industry.32 
                                                          
 27.  George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 
(1971). 
 28.  See Levine & Forrence, supra note 8, at 169 (“Opposing the ‘public interest’ theory is the 
‘capture,’ or ‘special interest’ theory (also known as the ‘economic,’ or ‘government services’ the-
ory) of regulatory behavior, which describes actors in the regulatory process as having narrow, self-
interested goals––principally job retention or the pursuit of reelection, self-gratification from the 
exercise of power, or perhaps postofficeholding personal wealth.” (footnote omitted)). 
 29.  See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS 
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regula-
tion, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. 
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974); Stigler, supra note 27. 
 30.  Protecting the Public Interest: Understanding the Threat of Agency Capture: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight & the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
(2010) (statement of Nicholas Bagley, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law 
School) [hereinafter Written Statement of Nicholas Bagley], https://www.judiciary.sen-
ate.gov/imo/media/doc/08-03-10%20Bagley%20Testimony.pdf.  
 31.  Written Statement of Nicholas Bagley, supra note 30, at 2–3; see also Nicholas Bagley & 
Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1284–
85 (2006); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency 
Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1343 (2012). 
 32.  Written Statement of Nicholas Bagley, supra note 30, at 3–4; see also Ernesto Dal Bó, 
Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 203, 211–212 (2006); Kwak, supra 
note 14, at 75. 
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Although the capture theory of regulation has proven enormously influ-
ential, in recent years it has been criticized on a number of different grounds, 
including that it offers a highly unrealistic description of how most regulatory 
agencies operate,33 its empirical underpinnings are flimsy,34 and it is impos-
sible to empirically prove or disprove.35  In perhaps the most comprehensive 
rebuttal of this account, Professor Steven Croley argues that administrative 
procedures serve to bolster agencies’ autonomy, insulate them against inter-
est group influence, and level the playing field for less well-resourced interest 
groups to compete with better-resourced ones.36  Croley notes, for example, 
that interest groups use information, rather than votes or the promise of cam-
paign contributions, to lobby agency regulators; agencies’ decision-making 
processes are more open than those of legislative committees; agency per-
sonnel have job security which insulates them from political pressure; and 
the threat of judicial review levels the playing field by forcing regulators to 
give adequate consideration to all the perspectives on the rule.37  To bolster 
his thesis, Croley presents case studies of several important regulatory initi-
atives in which federal agencies appeared to advance the interests of the gen-
eral public in the face of organized industry opposition.38 
More recent scholarship has re-conceptualized capture in ways that ad-
dress some of these criticisms.  Most notably, these theories articulate new 
possible mechanisms for capture that do not depend upon the assumption that 
                                                          
 33.  See, e.g., Written Statement of Nicholas Bagley, supra note 30, at 4 (“Although agency 
capture offers a compelling story about how some agencies operate some of the time, it is also a 
crude stereotype about agency behavior. Some agencies succumb to industry group pressure, but 
most resist it admirably.” (footnote omitted)). 
 34.  STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD 
REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 305–06 (2008) (“The public choice account of regulation is idea rich, 
but evidence poor.  It is easy to state, difficult to disprove, and resonates with deep-rooted and 
indeed often well-founded negative visions of politicians and politics.  But its empirical record, 
charitably tabulated, does not vindicate its deregulatory policy prescriptions.  Some regulation has 
undermined social welfare; much important regulation has not.”); Daniel Carpenter, Detecting and 
Measuring Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND 
HOW TO LIMIT IT, supra note 4, at 57. (“In short, the evidentiary standards of the capture literature 
are rather low . . . .”); Carrigan & Coglianese, supra note 26, at 1 (“[I]ts empirical evidence failed 
to rule out competing explanations, including the very possibility of the public interest theory that 
he sought to challenge.”). 
 35.  See Written Statement of Nicholas Bagley, supra note 30, at 5 (“The central problem with 
agency capture is that it is neither easily identifiable nor readily falsifiable.”). 
 36.  CROLEY, supra note 34, at 73–74; see also Paul Rose & Christopher J. Walker, Dodd-
Frank Regulators, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Agency Capture, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 15 
(2013), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/dodd-frank-regulators-cost-benefit-analysis-
and-agency-capture/ (arguing that cost-benefit analysis and notice-and-comment rulemaking to-
gether “should substantially disarm the threat of agency capture”). 
 37.  CROLEY, supra note 34, at 135–42.  
 38.  Id. at 157–212. 
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regulators always act in their own material self-interest.39  For example, Pro-
fessor James Kwak explores how cultural factors, such as regulators’ identi-
ties, social status, and relationships can cause even well-intentioned regula-
tors to inadvertently favor the regulated industry.40  Contra to Croley, 
Professor Wendy Wagner shows that the structures of administrative law em-
power interest groups to capture regulators by inundating them with complex 
information.41  For example, she documents how the rise of the “hard look” 
review doctrine, in which courts closely scrutinize agencies’ rulemakings to 
ensure that the agencies have adequately responded to all material comments, 
encourages interest groups to submit “highly specific, very detailed, [and] 
extensively documented comments on every conceivable point of contention, 
and to back up their comments with the threat of litigation.”42 
Yet unlike in traditional capture theory, which asserts that regulators “as 
a rule” will advance the interests of the regulated industry, these newer vari-
ants of capture do not necessarily imply that industry is always able to shape 
regulatory policy to achieve its desired ends.43  Kwak emphasizes that cul-
tural capture is not necessarily controlling and does not preclude the possi-
bility that public-interested regulators will overcome these challenges to act 
in the general public’s interest.44  Wagner argues that information capture 
“allows some parties to control or at least dominate regulatory outcomes us-
ing information.”45  In a similar vein, Professor Ganesh Sitaraman writes that 
regulatory capture “does not mean that regulations in the public interest are 
never possible but only that, when looked at in the aggregate, the system leans 
in a direction that tends to help powerful special interests rather than the pub-
lic interest.”46 
                                                          
 39.  See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 14, at 1392 (noting that “[c]ommitted EPA staff is likely to 
be an extremely important force in pushing back against unilateral pressure from one group, partic-
ularly industry”). 
 40.  Kwak, supra note 14, at 80. 
 41.  Wagner, supra note 14, at 1328 (arguing that “variety of doctrinal and statutory incentives 
unwittingly encourage regulatory participants to load the administrative system with more and more 
information in ways that ultimately undermine pluralistic oversight by creating unfair advantages 
for those advocates who have the resources to engage in these excessive processes”). 
 42.  Id. at 1362–63. 
 43.  Professors Christopher Carrigan and Cary Coglianese point out that Stigler himself “did 
not believe that all regulation is acquired by industry . . . [though] he did seem to think that a lot of 
regulation came into existence solely to serve industry’s interests.”  Carrigan & Coglianese, supra 
note 26, at 6 (emphasis added). 
 44.  Kwak, supra note 14, at 79, 94. 
 45.  Wagner, supra note 14, at 1328 (emphasis added).  
 46.  GANESH SITARAMAN, REFORMING REGULATION POLICIES TO COUNTERACT CAPTURE 
AND IMPROVE THE REGULATORY PROCESS 2 (2016). 
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Although these newer variants of capture avoid some of the unrealistic 
assumptions of traditional capture theory, their implications as to the magni-
tude of business influence are less clear.  These theories provide compelling 
reasons to think that agencies are biased in favor of business, but they offer 
less guidance as to what extent businesses actually control regulations.  
Whether businesses in practice succeed in controlling the rulemaking process 
is, therefore, an empirical question. 
B.  The Empirical Literature 
Like the theoretical literature on regulatory capture, the empirical liter-
ature on interest group influence in the rulemaking process by and large sup-
ports the notion that businesses play an outsized role in the regulatory pro-
cess, relative to other types of interest groups.  Yet also like the theoretical 
literature, the empirical literature does not yield definitive conclusions as to 
the magnitude of this influence—the extent to which interest groups are able 
to achieve their desired policy outcomes.47  This literature focuses on a few 
main questions: Who participates in the rulemaking process?  How much in-
fluence do they exert over regulatory outcomes?  And what are the determi-
nants of influence in the rulemaking process? 
1.  Participation and Participants 
There are several stages of the rulemaking process and multiple formal 
opportunities for individuals and organizations to participate.  The “best 
known and indeed archetypal” of these is the notice-and-comment process.48  
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), federal agencies are re-
quired to publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) in the Federal 
Register and provide the public an opportunity to comment before they issue 
a final rule (subject to certain exceptions).49  Agencies must then “process 
and then respond to, all significant comments.”50  In some cases, before an 
agency has issued a proposed rule, it may choose to issue a preliminary doc-
ument called an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“ANPRM”) to 
“[announce] that [the] agency is considering a regulatory action . . . before it 
develops a detailed proposed rule.”51  If an agency chooses to issue an 
                                                          
 47.  This agnosticism aligns with that expressed by Professors Wendy Wagner, Katherine 
Barnes, and Lisa Peters in their 2011 study. Wagner, Barnes, & Peters, supra note 13, at 152 (“Ul-
timately, even if interest group participation . . . is badly skewed, and even if this leads to rule 
changes that favor the dominant group, it is not clear what the substantive implications of this im-
balance might be.”). 
 48.  Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 7, at 362. 
 49.  Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
 50.  Wagner, supra note 14, at 1354 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)). 
 51.  Regulatory Information Service Center, Introduction to the Unified Agenda of Federal 
Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions—Fall 2016, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,496, 94,500 (Dec. 23, 2016). 
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ANPRM, then the public is given an opportunity to comment on that docu-
ment as well.52 
Most empirical studies of participation in the notice-and-comment pro-
cess find that businesses participate with greater frequency and intensity than 
public interest groups and members of the public, though public interest 
groups usually have at least some representation.  One early study is the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs’s 1977 report, Public Participa-
tion in Regulatory Agency Proceedings.  The Senate Committee asks a num-
ber of different agencies to identify the ten most significant of each agency’s 
last thirty rulemakings and adjudications and examine the regulatory dockets.  
It finds that there was no public interest representation in more than half of 
formal agency proceedings and almost none at informal proceedings.53   
Similarly, Professor Cary Coglianese examines interest group participa-
tion on the twenty-five significant rules that were issued by the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (“EPA”) under the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act (“RCRA”) between 1989 and 1991 and finds that “industry groups 
are by far the most active participants of all,” with businesses participating in 
96% and industry associations participating in 80% of the rules he exam-
ined.54  By contrast, other types of interest groups and individual members of 
the public have much lower levels of participation.  For instance, state gov-
ernments participated in only 52% of the rules, national environmental 
groups participated in only 44%, and individuals participated in only 40%.55  
Nearly 60% of the participants were business interests, and only 4% were 
from the environmental community.56 
Subsequent studies largely corroborate these findings, though with 
some exceptions.57  Professor Marissa Golden examines eleven federal rules 
at the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (“NHTSA”), and Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”).  Two of the regulatory agencies (EPA and NHTSA) 
                                                          
 52.  Id. 
 53.  See COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN REGULATORY 
AGENCY PROCEEDINGS, S. DOC. NO. 95-71, at vii (1977). 
 54.  Cary Coglianese, Challenging the Rules: Litigation and Bargaining in the Administrative 
Process 1, 70–71, 75 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with 
author). 
 55.  Id. at 73. 
 56.  Id. at 70–71.  
 57.  Yackee, Reconsidering Agency Capture, supra note 13, at 323 (conducting a content anal-
ysis of thirty-six rules from the DOT and finding that while businesses often participate at a high 
rate, this is not consistent across rulemakings).  High-salience rules appear to receive especially 
large numbers of comments from individual members of the public.  See, e.g., Coglianese, supra 
note 54, at 65 (“Rules of broad, foundational policy importance tend to attract large numbers of 
public comments.”). 
 
2020] FAILURE TO CAPTURE 713 
have extremely limited participation by public interest groups and individu-
als, and there is little citizen participation in any of the rules.58  Professors 
Jason and Susan Webb Yackee analyze over thirty rules and around 1700 
public comments from four U.S. federal agencies and find that business in-
terests submitted over 57% of the comments in their data set.59  Professors 
Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes, and Lisa Peters examine ninety Hazard-
ous Air Pollutant rules and find that comments from business interests com-
prise over 81% of the comments.60  Professors Scott Furlong and Cornelius 
Kerwin conduct a survey of interest groups and find that businesses partici-
pate in over twice as many rulemakings as public interest groups.61  By con-
trast, Justice Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar examines democratic participation 
in three different rulemakings issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
the Federal Election Commission, and the Treasury Department, and finds 
that even when form letters are excluded, “comments from individual mem-
bers of the lay public account for over 70% of comments” in two of the three 
regulations he examines.62 
The notice-and-comment process is not, however, the only—or the most 
important—opportunity for the public to participate in the rulemaking pro-
cess.  One crucial but “seldom studied” phase of the rulemaking process is 
the agenda-setting phase: the phase at which regulators decide to initiate a 
rulemaking process on a particular subject.63  The APA provides that “[e]ach 
agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance, 
amendment, or repeal of a rule.”64  Agencies must respond to these petitions, 
and if they deny them, provide reasons for their decisions,65 though judicial 
review of an agency’s denial of a rulemaking petition is typically “highly 
deferential.”66  Participating at this early stage of the rulemaking process—
either through submitting a petition for rulemaking or communicating 
                                                          
 58.  Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? 
Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 253, 255 (1998). 
 59.  Yackee & Yackee, supra note 13, at 131–33. 
 60.  Wagner, Barnes, & Peters, supra note 13, at 128–29. 
 61.  Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 7, at 361. 
 62.  Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 
429, 460 (2005).   
 63.  Cary Coglianese & Daniel E. Walters, Agenda-Setting in the Regulatory State: Theory and 
Evidence, 68 ADMIN. L. REV 93, 94, 97 (2016) (treating agenda-setting “in a relatively open-ended, 
broad fashion so as to include all the choices and opportunities that both agency officials and other 
participants in the regulatory process have about what problems agencies emphasize and what al-
ternatives they consider”). 
 64.  Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012). 
 65.  Id. § 555(b). 
 66.  Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 
96–97 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Livermore & Revesz, supra note 31, at 1382. 
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through informal channels—is thought to be a more effective means of influ-
encing a rule than participating in the public comment process, since the rule 
must be very close to fully developed by the time it is proposed.67 
The empirical research that focuses on this stage of the rulemaking pro-
cess concludes that business interests participate more than other types of 
interest groups.  Professor Kimberly Krawiec takes advantage of special 
transparency requirements in the Dodd-Frank Act to analyze interest group 
participation in the early development the Volcker Rule.68  From analyzing 
thousands of public comments submitted in advance of the issuance of the 
Volcker Rule NPRM and the logs of hundreds of meetings with agency offi-
cials, Krawiec concludes that the “battleground is dominated by regulated 
industry.”69  In a review of 276 rules, Professor William West and Connor 
Raso find that 60% of the rules in their sample were issued at the agencies’ 
discretion and business groups disproportionately participated in the agenda-
setting process for these discretionary rules.70  Indeed, they find only five 
discretionary rules in which public interest groups were involved at the 
agenda-setting phase, suggesting that “participation in agenda setting may be 
significantly more one-sided” than participation in the public comment pro-
cess.71 
Some evidence suggests public interest groups may play a more active 
role in nondiscretionary rules, particularly those issued pursuant to a court 
order.  Coglianese finds that environmental groups file most of the deadline 
suits brought against the EPA (lawsuits brought to compel an agency to issue 
a rule in response to a congressionally-imposed deadline).72  Professor 
Wendy Wagner, Professor Katherine Barnes, and Lisa Peters find that sixty-
six (73%) of the Hazardous Air Pollutants rules in their sample were prom-
ulgated under court orders from deadline suits filed in the United States  
                                                          
 67.  KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 5, at 200 (describing two studies which find that “busi-
ness interests participate more actively and effectively during the important early stage of rule de-
velopment”); E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L. J. 1490, 1495 (1992) (“Be-
cause of the need to create a record, real public participation—the kind of back and forth dialogue 
in which minds (and rules) are really changed—primarily takes place in various fora well in advance 
of a notice of proposed rulemaking appearing in the Federal Register.”); Wagner, Barnes, & Peters, 
supra note 13, at 110 (“Ironically . . . the emphasis on developing a proposed rule that is ready for 
comment pushes a great deal of the policymaking and true regulatory work earlier in the process, 
during the rule development stage.  Indeed, the courts have made it painfully clear that if a rule is 
to survive judicial review, it must be essentially in final form at the proposed rule stage.”). 
 68.  Kimberly Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of Financial 
Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 53 (2013). 
 69.  See id. at 84. 
 70.  West & Raso, supra note 13, at 495, 504. 
 71.  Id. at 510.  But see COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN 
REGULATORY AGENCY PROCEEDINGS, S. Doc. No. 95-71, at 14–15 (1977) (finding that at two 
agencies, public interest groups filed as many or more petitions for rulemaking then businesses). 
 72.  Coglianese, supra note 54, at 42. 
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Courts of Appeals, and they assume that these cases are predominantly 
brought by public interest groups.73 
Another important stage of the rulemaking process at which interest 
groups may participate is the OIRA review process.  Under Executive Order 
12,866, federal agencies are required to submit all “significant regulatory ac-
tion[s]” to OIRA for review before they can become final.74  Perhaps the most 
well-known part of this review process involves reviewing the costs and ben-
efits of new rules.75  Once the agency formally submits a rule to OIRA for 
review, interest groups and members of the public are given an opportunity 
to meet with OIRA to express their views on the rule.76  OIRA’s policy in 
recent years has also been “to meet with any party interested in discussing 
issues on a rule under review.”77 
Once again, most evidence finds that businesses participate more in-
tensely at this phase of the rulemaking process.78  Croley examines all OIRA 
meetings from 1993 to 2000 and finds that 56% of the meetings included only 
businesses and trade associations, 28% included business interests and public 
interest organizations, 10% were attended only by public interest organiza-
tions, and 5% were attended only by governmental groups.79  Professor Rena 
Steinzor, Michael Patoka, and James Goodwin examine interest group par-
ticipation in 6194 OIRA reviews between 2001 and 2011, and find that 65% 
of the attendees at these meetings represented industry—around five times as 
many people who represented public interest groups.80 
Interest group participation in the rulemaking process does not end 
when a final rule is issued.  For instance, different kinds of interest groups 
may resort to submitting administrative appeals or even filing for judicial re-
view in the United States Courts of Appeals to vindicate their interests.81  As 
                                                          
 73.  Wagner, Barnes, & Peters, supra note 13, at 137. 
 74.  Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994). 
 75.  Livermore & Revesz, supra note 31, at 1370 (“At the heart of OIRA’s review of agency 
decision making is the cost-benefit standard, which requires, to the extent possible, that agencies 
identify and quantify the benefits and costs of proposed rulemakings.”). 
 76.  3 C.F.R. 638. 
 77.  Regulations and the Rulemaking Process, OFF. INFO. & REG. AFF., https://www.re-
ginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/faq.myjsp#reg_rule (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). 
 78.  Bagley & Revesz, supra note 31, at 1306 (“Predictably, then—and despite OIRA’s location 
within the Executive Office of the President—the available evidence supports the view that the mix 
of participants active in the OIRA review process heavily favors industry.”).  
 79.  Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 857–58 (2003). 
 80.  RENA STEINZOR, MICHAEL PATOKA, & JAMES GOODWIN, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS AT 
THE WHITE HOUSE: HOW POLITICS TRUMP PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH, WORKER SAFETY 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 3, 5, 8 (2011); Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized White 
House Regulatory Review, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209, 263 (2012). 
 81.  Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012). 
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Coglianese points out, ex ante there are some reasons to suggest that busi-
nesses might file more litigation over rules, but there are other countervailing 
reasons to suggest that public interest groups may file more litigation.  On 
the one hand, business interests tend to have greater incentives and resources; 
on the other hand, litigation tends to be an “outside” strategy, pursued by 
groups who are excluded from the political process.82 
Yet here too, the empirical evidence that exists suggests that business 
interests participate more intensely at this stage of the rulemaking process.  
In his own study, Coglianese reports that in 908 cases filed against the EPA 
from 1987 to 1991 most of the “lead plaintiffs” were corporations or trade 
associations.83  More recently, Wagner, Barnes, and Peters find that of the 
twenty rules in their study that were the subjects of petitions for reconsider-
ation or suits for judicial review, business interests filed nine of these peti-
tions, public interest groups filed four, and both groups jointly filed seven.84 
Thus, with some exceptions, the empirical literature by and large sup-
ports the notion that businesses disproportionately participate throughout 
every stage of the rulemaking process, though public interest groups usually 
have some representation at most stages.  This is further substantiated by a 
survey of interest groups conducted by Furlong and Kerwin, which finds that 
85% of the trade associations and businesses report participating in the rule-
making process, compared to about 75% of public interest groups.85 
2.  Influence 
Imbalances in interest group participation in administrative rulemaking 
do not necessarily translate into imbalances in influence, however, and the 
empirical evidence on interest group influence in the rulemaking process is 
more equivocal.86  Several early studies find participation in the public com-
ment process generally did not have much influence over the content of 
rules.87  Professor Wesley Magat, Alan Krupnick, & Winston Harrington find 
                                                          
 82.  Coglianese, supra note 5455, at 69. 
 83.  Id. at 100. 
 84.  Wagner, Barnes, & Peters, supra note 13, at 135. 
 85.  Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 7, at 359–60. 
 86.  See CROLEY, supra note 34, at 127 (“But estimates of the frequency with which various 
parties participate in agency decisionmaking processes and the amount of resources those parties 
commit to their participation are meaningful only inasmuch as they provide reliable markers of 
parties’ abilities to affect the substance of agency decisions.  Ultimately, it is efficacious participa-
tion, not mere participation, that affects regulatory outcomes.  Measurements of participation quan-
tify the efforts different types of interests make to influence agency decisionmakers, but whether 
those efforts spell proportionately more influence is a separate question.”).  
 87.  For example, Professor E. Donald Elliott famously described the notice-and-comment pro-
cess as Kabuki theater and claimed that it is “primarily a method for compiling a record for judicial 
review.”  Elliott, supra note 67, at 1492. 
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that active participation by businesses during the notice-and-comment pro-
cess generally did not translate into weaker regulations.88  Professors David 
C. Nixon, Robert M. Howard, and Jeff R. DeWitt examine a sample of 
twenty-one rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which 
they hypothesize “represents the classic profile for the agency capture the-
sis.”89  Focusing on references to comments in the preamble of the final rule, 
they find that there is “practically no evidence” that more institutionally ad-
vantaged commenters (such as industry groups or self-regulatory organiza-
tions) are more likely to have their policy concerns addressed in notice-and-
comment process.90  More recently, Professor Susan Webb Yackee examines 
thirty-six rules from the DOT issued between 2002 and 2005 and finds that 
“businesses are not consistently influential.”91 
Other research finds that comments do result in cosmetic changes to the 
rule but that these changes are not very consequential.  Golden finds that “in 
the majority of cases the agency made some of the changes that were re-
quested by commenters, but it rarely altered the heart of the proposal.”92  Pro-
fessor Stuart Shapiro examines twelve economically significant regulations 
issued between 2008 and 2010, and finds that agencies agreed with the com-
menters on 42% of the issues raised, but that agencies were more likely to 
change regulations when the requested changes were minor clarifications ra-
ther than substantive changes to policy.93  Professor William West examines 
the notice-and-comment process in a sample of forty-two rules and finds that 
twenty-eight of the rules involved significant conflict, and sixteen of those 
rules changed.94  However, he concludes that changes during the notice-and-
comment process “are difficult, they are often confined to excision as a path 
of least resistance, and they seldom address the fundamental nature of the 
policy.”95  Furlong and Kerwin conduct a survey of interest groups and find 
that they do perceive written comments as being effective but that they “may 
                                                          
 88.  WESLEY MAGAT, ALAN KRUPNICK, & WINSTON HARRINGTON, RULES IN THE MAKING: 
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY AGENCY BEHAVIOR 143–45 (1986).  
 89.  David C. Nixon, Robert M. Howard & Jeff R. DeWitt, With Friends Like These: Rule-
Making Comment Submissions to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 12 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. 
& THEORY 59, 61 (2002). 
 90.  Id. at 74. 
 91.  Yackee, Reconsidering Agency Capture, supra note 13, at 320. 
 92.  Golden, supra note 58, at 259. 
 93.  Stuart Shapiro, When Will They Listen? Public Comment and Highly Salient Regulations 
10–13 (Mercatus Ctr. George Mason Univ. Working Paper No. 13–15, 2013). 
 94.  William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Respon-
siveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66, 
71 (2004). 
 95.  Id. at 74. 
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not necessarily see written comment as effective relative to other tech-
niques.”96 
Several other recent studies, however, have found that interest groups’ 
participation in the public comment process—and business participation in 
particular—does influence rules.  Using content analysis to study over thirty 
rules and over 1700 public comments from four federal agencies, Yackee and 
Yackee find that business commenters, but not nonbusiness commenters, 
hold important influence over the content of final rules—as measured by 
whether the rule becomes more or less stringent overall from the proposed 
rule stage to the final rule stage.97  Susan Webb Yackee examines a selection 
of forty rules promulgated by four federal agencies and finds that the agencies 
often adapt the rule during the notice-and-comment period to better match 
the position of participating interest groups.98  Wagner, Barnes, and Peters 
find a rough correlation of one change in the NPRM for every two issues 
raised by commenters, and they find that the number of changes weakening 
the rule increased with the number of comments from industry.99 
In the largest-scale study of its kind, Professors Andrei Kirilenko, 
Shawn Mankad, and George Michailidis employ a machine-learning algo-
rithm to examine 60,000 comments, 104 proposed rules, and 67 final rules 
issued by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission between 2010 and 
2013.100  Kirilenko, Mankad, and Michailidis find that only those from the 
regulated industry have an impact on the content of the final rule, but they 
find that greater consensus among public comments, along with comments 
from certain types of organizations, increases the chances of a rule being fi-
nalized.101 
A few studies have found evidence of interest group influence in the 
regulatory process at other stages of the rulemaking process.  Keith Naugh-
ton, Celeste Schmid, Susan Webb Yackee and Xueyong Zhan use content 
analysis to study how a sample of thirty-six DOT rules change from the 
ANPRM stage to the NPRM stage, and they find that these comments are 
associated with changes in the content of the rule and whether the rule is 
withdrawn.102  Professors David Nelson and Susan Webb Yackee examine a 
sample of rules from the DOT and find that lobbying coalitions influence the 
                                                          
 96.  Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 7, at 365. 
 97.  Yackee & Yackee, supra note 13, at 133–35.  
 98.  Susan Webb Yackee, Sweet Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest Group 
Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 103 (2006). 
 99.  Wagner, Barnes, & Peters, supra note 13, at 130-131. 
 100.  Kirilenko, Mankad & Michailidis supra note 13, at 3. 
 101.  Id. at 4. 
 102.  Keith Naughton et al., Understanding Commenter Influence During Agency Rule Devel-
opment, 28 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 258 (2009). 
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development of rules from the ANPRM stage to the NPRM stage.103  Susan 
Webb Yackee also finds that ex parte contacts do influence regulatory out-
puts and that they are a “potential factor in causing the withdrawal of regula-
tions from consideration.”104  Professors Simon F. Haeder and Susan Webb 
Yackee study 1526 “economically significant” regulations that were re-
viewed by OIRA between 2005 and 2011 and find that lobbying by business 
interests is associated with regulatory change, but that the same is not true 
for public interest groups.105  Daniel E. Walters analyzes data on rulemaking 
petitions and finds that although business interests—when examined to-
gether—had a greater chance of having a petition granted than non-business 
interests, this advantage disappears when business interests are disaggre-
gated.106  He finds that while the identity of the petitioner “does not seem to 
drive agency decision-making with regard to rulemaking petitions . . . agen-
cies favor rulemaking petitions that request narrow, technical changes in a 
deregulatory direction.”107 
3.  Determinants of Influence 
There are two primary hypotheses regarding the conditions under which 
interest groups are most likely to influence rules.  First, perhaps the most 
well-established hypothesis is that influence is determined by the size of a 
group and the consensus among its participants.  Nelson and Yackee theorize 
that coalition size and consensus determine influence because they send a 
signal to policymakers regarding the magnitude of strength or opposition for 
a particular policy proposal and because coalition leaders are strategic about 
                                                          
 103.  David Nelson & Susan Webb Yackee, Lobbying Coalitions and Government Policy 
Change: An Analysis of Federal Agency Rulemaking, 74 J. POL. 339 (2012). 
 104.  Yackee, The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying, supra note 13, at 374. 
 105.  Haeder & Yackee, supra note 13, at 1, 6; see also Bagley & Revesz, supra note 31, at 1307 
(“Drawing firm conclusions about influence from participation rates is tricky, but GAO’s data are 
suggestive: Of the twenty-five rules that OIRA ‘significantly affected’ in 2002, outside parties com-
mented on eleven of them—and for seven of those eleven rules, ‘at least some of the actions that 
OIRA recommended were similar to those suggested’ by the industry groups.” (footnote omitted) 
(citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCY RULES AND 
THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS (2003))).  But see Croley, supra note 79, at 859–61 (find-
ing that interest group representation in OIRA meetings was not correlated with the probability of 
rule change during the review process); Livermore & Revesz, supra note 31, at 1358–59 (conclud-
ing that “[t]he imbalance in the number of meetings . . . says less about OIRA’s preferred meeting 
partners than the relative ability to participate in the process of industry compared to protection-
oriented groups.”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and 
Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1860–63 (2013) (arguing that the importance of 12866 meetings 
has been “greatly exaggerated” and that “the sheer number of meetings, and the identity of those 
who ask for meetings, say very little about the nature of the OIRA process”). 
 106.  Daniel E. Walters, Capturing the Regulatory Agenda: An Empirical Study of Agency Re-
sponsiveness to Rulemaking Petitions, 43 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 213 (2019) 
 107.  Id. at 214. 
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whom they recruit into their coalitions.108  Similarly, Kerwin and Furlong 
observe that “[p]ublic comments help agencies determine the degrees of ac-
ceptance and resistance in the affected communities to the rule under devel-
opment.”109  They suggest that this information may help agency officials 
figure out what kinds of monitoring and enforcement systems they will need 
to implement, as well as gauge the likelihood of future litigation.110 
There are a number of empirical studies that support the hypothesis that 
more unified interest groups have more influence in the rulemaking pro-
cess.111  Yackee and Yackee find “[w]hen business commenters are united in 
their desire to see less regulation in a final rule . . . they will receive less reg-
ulation over 90% of the time,”112 though they caution that their findings may 
not be applicable to high-salience rulemakings, in which other types of inter-
est groups are more likely to participate.113 
The second theory is that more sophisticated participants are more likely 
to influence regulatory outcomes.  Cuéllar suggests a few reasons why this 
may be the case: Agency staff have limited resources so will be more respon-
sive to comments that they can easily understand how to address; agency staff 
may believe that the issues raised in more sophisticated comments are more 
likely to be scrutinized in judicial review; and more sophisticated comment-
ers may know “how to make recommendations that fall within the staff’s 
purview, thus gaining a chance to persuade the staff about how to use its 
discretion.”114 
                                                          
 108.  Nelson & Yackee, supra note 103, at 342–43. 
 109.  KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 5, at 169. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  See, e.g., Golden, supra note 58, at 259 (finding that agencies are most likely to modify 
their NPRMs when there is consensus among commenters); Haeder & Yackee, supra note 13, at 1 
(finding that both the number of interest groups and the consensus among them are positively asso-
ciated with a change in the rule, though these results hold only for industry and not public interest 
groups); Amy McKay & Susan Webb Yackee, Interest Group Competition on Federal Agency 
Rules, 35 AM. POL. RES. 336 (2007) (finding that an interest group’s dominance in the public com-
ment process translates to influence on the rule); Stuart Shapiro, Does the Amount of Participation 
Matter? Public Comments, Agency Responses and the Time to Finalize a Regulation, 41 POL. SCI. 
33 (2008) (finding that agencies make changes to the their proposed rule when they receive a lot of 
comments on highly complex rules that are not politically salient but that high comment volume did 
not lead to changes from the proposed rule on high-salience or low-complexity rules); Yackee & 
Yackee, supra note 13, at 128 (finding that businesses are more influential when more businesses 
and fewer non-businesses participate).  But see Nixon, et al., supra note 89, at 59 (finding little 
evidence that the number or proportion of commenters in favor of a specific request determines the 
likelihood that that request will be reflected in the final rule); Susan Webb Yackee, Assessing Inter-
Institutional Attention to and Influence on Government Regulations, 36 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 723, 
740 (2006) (finding no evidence that increased consensus among interest groups as to whether the 
rule should become more or less stringent enhances influence). 
 112.  Yackee & Yackee, supra note 13, at 135. 
 113.  Id. at 137. 
 114.  Cuéllar, supra note 62, at 482–85.  
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There is some—albeit more limited—evidence to support this hypothe-
sis.  Drawing on interviews with agency officials involved in drafting rules, 
Cuéllar develops a series of questions designed to measure the sophistication 
of public comment letters, and he finds some “initial evidence” to support 
this hypothesis.115  Other research finds that businesses and industry associ-
ations tend to submit much more sophisticated comments than individual 
members of the public.116  Steven Rashin analyzes 47,000 comments to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, and finds that organizations that sub-
mit comments that include data and industry-specific language are more 
likely to result in modifications to proposed rules.117  
Both of these theories of influence have been invoked to support the 
hypothesis that businesses are more influential in the rulemaking process than 
other kinds of interest groups.  Because of businesses’ superior resources and 
organizational capacity, they are better equipped than other kinds of interest 
groups and members of the public both to build large coalitions and to par-
ticipate in more rulemakings.118  In addition, Yackee and Yackee suggest that 
business interests are more uniform than the interests of other types of interest 
                                                          
 115.  Id. at 476.  Cuéllar’s sophistication scale relies on five questions: (1) “Did the commenter 
distinguish the regulation from the statutory requirements?”; (2) “Did the commenter . . . indicat[e] 
an understanding of . . . the statutory requirement?”; (3) “Did the commenter propose an explicit 
change in the regulation provided in the notice of proposed rulemaking . . . ?”; (4) “Did the com-
menter provide at least one example or discrete logical argument for why the commenter’s concern 
should be addressed?”; and (5) “Did the commenter provide any legal, policy, or empirical back-
ground information to place the suggestions in context?”  Id. at 431.  But see Yackee & Yackee, 
supra note 13, at 136 (applying their own measure of comment quality, and finding no evidence 
that businesses submit higher-quality comments, despite having more influence in the notice-and-
comment process). 
 116.  Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE 
L. J. 943, 959 (2006) (“According to one recent study of about 500,000 comments submitted on an 
especially controversial EPA rule, less than 1[%] of these comments reportedly had anything orig-
inal to say.” (citing David Schlosberg et al., “To Submit a Form or Not to Submit a Form, That Is 
the (Real) Question”: Deliberation and Mass Participation in U.S. Regulatory Rulemaking II (May 
5, 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal))); Krawiec, supra note 68, 
at 77–78 (“[I]mportantly, the citizen letters provide . . . little evidence that commenters even under-
stand, or care, what proprietary trading or fund investment is, much less the ways in which the 
Volcker Rule might govern such activities.  The contrast with the meticulously drafted, argued, and 
researched—though far less numerous—letters from financial industry members and trade groups 
is stark.” (footnote omitted)).  
 117.  Steven Rashin, Private Influence on the Regulatory Process: Evidence from Comments on 
Rules 2, 4 (Mar. 25, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.drop-
box.com/s/q2lz007jv4vt3hv/Rashin-Private-Influence-8-23.pdf?dl=0. 
 118.  Wagner, Barnes, & Peters, supra note 13, at 116 (“Finally, the notice-and-comment pro-
cess itself may be ‘open’ to all, but in practice accessible to only a few, at least when rules are very 
complex and technical. . . . While expert, sophisticated public interest groups may be able to pene-
trate these costly rules, even they will lack resources to engage in all of them and may find they 
must dedicate resources to only a few.”). 
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groups so it is easier for them to achieve consensus.119  Similarly, several 
scholars have suggested that businesses may be more likely to have the ca-
pacity to provide richer and more sophisticated feedback on regulations that 
includes analysis on technical, legal, or policy matters.120 
4.  Conclusions and Hypotheses 
Although the empirical literature on interest group influence in the rule-
making process is not uniform in its results, it supports a few conclusions: 
With some exceptions—perhaps particularly for high-salience rules and 
deadline suits—businesses tend to participate to a greater extent at most 
stages of the rulemaking process than public interest groups and individu-
als.121  The findings on influence are more equivocal, but the recent literature 
in particular supports the conclusion that business interests exert more influ-
ence than other interest groups during the regulatory process.122  The deter-
minants of this influence are still not well-understood, but there is evidence 
that interest group influence is determined by the number of participants in a 
group and the consensus among them (at least in low-salience rulemakings), 
as well their relative sophistication.123 
Yet a careful review of this literature also raises several possible reasons 
why business interests may have less influence over the rulemaking process 
than this evidence alone suggests.  Some of these reasons have to do with 
constraints on businesses influence, while others involve methodological is-
sues that may give the impression that businesses have more influence than 
they really do. 
                                                          
 119.  Yackee & Yackee, supra note 13, at 130 (“Of course, not all business comments will be 
unified in their suggestions for change and the degree of consensus in their messages should affect 
the ability to persuade agencies.  However, on average, we may expect more cohesion in matters of 
regulatory policy between business interests than other groups of potential participants.”). 
 120.  KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 5, at 194 (“Data we have collected in our previous sur-
veys suggest that businesses, and the trade associations that represent businesses and professions, 
are involved in rulemaking more often than are other groups, and they devote to it greater slices of 
their likely larger budgets and staffs.  A strong case can be made that their superior resources and 
experience lead to a degree of influence in rulemaking that others cannot match.  But the data from 
our surveys are not sufficient to establish such a case.”); Yackee & Yackee, supra note 13, at 131 
(outlining several reasons why this might be the case).  
 121.  See supra Section I.B.1. 
 122.  See supra Section I.B.2. 
 123.  See supra Section I.B.3. 
 
2020] FAILURE TO CAPTURE 723 
Hypothesis 1: Businesses may take very different positions on 
regulatory issues, even when they are broadly in favor of less 
regulation.   
Although the empirical literature finds that business interests dominate 
the rulemaking process, and that consensus among business interests is one 
of the main determinants of whether they have influence in the rulemaking 
process, some of this literature relies on a fairly coarse-grained definition of 
consensus.  This literature either treats interest groups as being in consensus 
if they consistently are in favor of more or less stringent regulation overall or 
if they support or oppose a rule.124  Yet it is possible that business interests 
are unified in these general respects, and yet still sharply disagree on im-
portant aspects of the rule.125 
Business interests may take very different positions on regulatory is-
sues, depending on their industry, size, region, and other factors.126  Such 
inter-industry and inter-business conflicts can have the effect of hampering 
business’s ability to obtain beneficial regulatory changes.127  In fact, rather 
                                                          
 124.  See, e.g., Nelson & Yackee, supra note 103, at 347 (measuring “Rule Consensus by first 
identifying the regulatory direction desired by each of the study’s respondents . . . [then comparing] 
the desired direction of all coalition participants across each sample rule” (emphasis omitted)). 
 125.  See David M. Hart, “Business” Is Not an Interest Group: On the Study of Companies in 
American National Politics, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 47 (2004) (arguing that interest group theory 
does not provide an adequate framework for understanding businesses, and calling on political sci-
ence researchers to devote more study to individual firms). 
 126.  Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory 
Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 298–99 (2004) (“Older firms frequently have interests that 
differ from newer firms.  Suppliers’ interests can differ from those of manufacturers.  Firms selling 
to regional or niche markets may differ from firms selling to a broad, national market.  Differences 
in firms’ cost structures, technologies, and comparative abilities will affect attitudes toward disclos-
ing information to regulators.  Firms also differ in the degree to which they are regulated.  Some 
firms are affected by an entire series of regulations issued by a government agency, while other 
firms are affected by only a few of the agency’s rules.  Firms that interact with a regulatory agency 
on an ongoing basis will have stronger interests in open and accurate disclosure of otherwise adverse 
information on any given issue than firms that rarely interact with the agency; the former have more 
need to maintain their credibility with the regulator.”). 
 127.  KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 5, at 211 (“There are examples of programs that are 
seemingly dominated by what we would call business interests . . . . But, at the same time, a degree 
of conflict between these two business interests effectively prevented either of them from dominat-
ing the process.”).  For a recent high-profile example of this, see Patrick Radden Keefe, Carl Icahn’s 
Failed Raid on Washington, NEW YORKER (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/maga-
zine/2017/08/28/carl-icahns-failed-raid-on-washington (describing how opposition from the etha-
nol industry helped to quash an attempt by Carl Icahn to convince the Trump Administration to 
change an EPA regulation that would have benefited him).  But see Krawiec, supra note 68, at 82 
(finding in her study of interest group participation in the development of the Volcker Rule that 
“financial industry interests appear . . . more unified in their interests than press reports and the 
legislative history would predict, reducing the probability that conflict among powerful interest 
groups will diminish the influence of any single position”). 
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than always being opposed to stronger regulations, business interests some-
times join public interest groups in seeking stronger regulatory require-
ments.128  These differing priorities provide more reason to be skeptical that 
imbalances in participation between businesses and other types of interest 
groups in the rulemaking process translate to equivalent differences in influ-
ence. 
Business interests appear to be lobbying more at cross-purposes in re-
cent years.  In one study of business lobbying, Lee Drutman observes that 
inter- and intra-industry competition has become more common as more 
companies have begun hiring their own lobbyists and ceased relying as heav-
ily on trade associations.129  He observes that today, “[r]arely does ‘business’ 
lobby as a single unified entity.  More and more, corporate lobbying involves 
fights between industries and even between companies.”130 
Hypothesis 2: Businesses may often not receive their desired rule 
changes, even when the stringency of the rule shifts in the direction 
that they desire. 
There are multiple ways to measure interest group influence in the rule-
making process, and it is not known whether these different measures yield 
consistent results.  For example, much of Susan Webb Yackee and her coau-
thors’ work measures influence at the rule level, coding whether each com-
ment is in favor of more or less stringent regulation and then noting whether 
the rule actually became more or less strict overall from the proposed to final 
rule stage.131  By comparison, Wagner, Barnes, and Peters examine the most 
significant requests for changes to the rule (as enumerated by the agency in 
                                                          
 128.  See FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, 
WHO LOSES, AND WHY 12 (2009) (“Citizen groups, like others, typically participate in policy de-
bates alongside other actors of many types who share the same goals.  For every citizen group op-
posing an action by a given industrial group, for example, there may also be an ally coming from a 
competing industry with which the group can join forces.”); Livermore & Revesz, supra note 31, at 
1355 (describing the “Bootleggers and Baptists” coalition, in which public interest groups team up 
with businesses to enact anti-competitive regulations); Shapiro, supra note 21, at 240 (“[N]ot all 
business related comments seek the same ends.  Some corporations (or trade associations) may find 
it in their self-interest to support stronger regulation.”); West & Raso, supra note 13, at 508 (“Busi-
ness interests do not always speak with a common voice.  Characterizing rulemaking by the Fisher-
ies Service of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration as ‘the politics of greed,’ for 
example, an official from that agency’s Alaska region noted that the recreational fishing industry 
(charter boats), large commercial fishermen, and small commercial fishermen often had conflicting 
interests.  Nor are the goals of business groups necessarily incompatible with those of less well-
represented constituents.  Requests from mortgage bankers for the Rural Housing Service (of the 
US Department of Agriculture) to simplify its loan-application rules may also benefit the low-in-
come families that agency was created to serve.”). 
 129.  LEE DRUTMAN, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA IS LOBBYING 112–17 (2015). 
 130.  Id. at 23. 
 131.  See, e.g., Yackee & Yackee, supra note 13, at 131–32. 
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the preamble to the final rule), whether they asked for a stronger or weaker 
regulatory requirement, and whether the specific changes they sought were 
granted by the agency in the final rule how the agency responded to these 
requests.132  One alternative approach follows Cuéllar, who records the total 
number of suggestions raised in each comment that were adopted by changes 
in the rule, along with whether any suggestion in the comment was 
adopted.133 
Golden observes, empirically measuring influence is “one of political 
science’s thorniest problems.”134  Each of these methodologies has its own 
advantages and potential drawbacks.  The first two measures make it more 
feasible to analyze a larger number of comments and rules; yet they could 
conceivably lead to overestimating influence, as there may be situations 
where the stringency of the rule or one part of the rule shifts in the direction 
that the commenter wanted but the agency rejects the specific changes that 
the commenter requested.135  By contrast, measuring influence by calculating 
the proportion of specific policy concerns raised in the comments that are 
adopted in the final rule, as Cuéllar does, would seem to obviate this problem.  
Yet tracing out which specific concerns were adopted is likely more time-
intensive, which makes it more difficult to analyze a large sample of rules 
and comments, thus limiting the generalizability of the study.  Furthermore, 
whereas the previous methodologies may be over-inclusive, this measure 
might understate interest group influence, as interest groups could still have 
an impact on the development of the rule without receiving the specific 
changes they requested.136 
                                                          
 132.  Wagner, Barnes, & Peters, supra note 13, at 155. 
 133.  Cuéllar treats a suggestion as being “adopted” when:  
(a) the agency makes precisely the change requested by a comment, (b) the agency claims 
in the Federal Register statement accompanying the final rule that a particular change 
was made in response to concerns raised in comments like the one in question, or (c) the 
agency makes a change that renders moot the concerns raised in the comments in ques-
tion. 
Cuéllar, supra note 62, at 433–34. 
 134.  Golden, supra note 58, at 259; see also KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 5, at 210 (“De-
termining whether interest groups that participate get what they want is an analytical task as difficult 
as it is important.  Much must be known about the law that established the boundaries of the rule-
making, the true preferences of the groups affected, the accuracy of the communication of those 
preferences to the agency decision makers, and the benefits the rule bestows and the costs it im-
poses.”). 
 135.  CROLEY, supra note 34, at 132–33 (“[S]ome studies concluding that interest groups influ-
ence rulemaking find influence in the form of curtailing the scope of a proposed rule rather than 
altering the rule’s content.  To that extent, interest groups do not get what they want from agencies, 
but merely less of what they do not want.”).   
 136.  See KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 5, at 212 (describing several examples from case 
studies illustrating “that business interests do gain important concessions in rulemaking even when 
they are not able to achieve all they wanted”).  Granted, Cuéllar’s definition of “adopted suggestion” 
encompasses cases where the agency doesn’t fully adopt the commenter’s request, but only if the 
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Hypothesis 3: Focusing on changes made during the notice-and-
comment period may overstate business influence. 
Although most of the empirical literature focuses on changes made to 
rules during one or two stages of the rulemaking process, changes made dur-
ing one stage may have been shaped by influence exerted at earlier stages or 
be negated by subsequent developments.  For instance, Magat, Krupnick, and 
Harrington find that rules which start out more stringent are more likely to 
become less stringent at a later stage.137  Ideally, then, gauging interest group 
influence requires evaluating the changes made to a rule over its entire lifecy-
cle, though this is difficult for reasons explored below.138 
In particular, although much of the literature focuses on the notice-and-
comment period, there are reasons to think that business interests may be 
more successful at this stage of the rulemaking process than in the rest of the 
rulemaking process.  Some scholars have suggested that agencies may be 
more likely to grant requests from commenters seeking a less stringent rule 
because the agencies view such changes “as less vulnerable to arguments that 
‘material changes’ were made as compared with comments that demand ad-
justments or additions to the text.”139  If a court rules that the final rule is not 
the “logical outgrowth” of the proposed rule, then the court could force the 
agency to repeat notice-and-comment all over again or even reissue the rule 
entirely.140  For the same reason, the types of changes that agencies can make 
to rules at this late stage of the rulemaking process are relatively limited. 
                                                          
agency explicitly states in the final rule preamble that it altered the rule in response to the com-
menter’s suggestion.  Cuéllar, supra note 62, at 433–34.  Since agencies usually do not describe all 
of the changes that they made to a proposed rule, it seems likely that this will still understate interest 
group influence.   
 137.  MAGAT, KRUPNICK & HARRINGTON, supra note 88, at 74, 153–54 (“[I]f a rule under con-
sideration is made especially stringent during an early stage of the process, it is likely to become 
less stringent at a later stage.”). 
 138.  See infra note 151 and accompanying text; see also Furlong, supra note 7, at 341 (“Future 
research may want to look at the development of policies from ‘cradle to grave’ and examine interest 
group participation throughout.  This may help in developing a better measure of influence that 
others may apply to future studies.”). 
 139.  Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 13, at 132 & n.118 (“One possible implication of the 
need to provide adequate notice is a bias in favor of subtractive changes in proposed rules.  Deletions 
in response to public comment thus are not subject to the criticism that they have caught stakehold-
ers by surprise.” (quoting William F. West, Inside the Black Box: The Development of Proposed 
Rules and the Limits of Procedural Controls, 41 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 576, 581 (2009))); West, supra 
note 94, at 67 (“Changes are made frequently enough during the comment phase of rulemaking, but 
they tend to be small and painful, and they are often subtractive rather than innovative or additive.”). 
 140.  Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 174 (2007) (quoting Nat’l Black 
Media Coal. v. FCC, 791 F.2d 1016, 1022 (2d Cir. 1986)); Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 
13, at 110 (citing Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 856, 893–900 (2007)). 
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Coglianese also suggests that focusing on the notice-and-comment pe-
riod may exaggerate interest group influence because at least some of the 
changes made during this process in particular may reflect strategic behavior 
on the part of agencies, rather than substantive policy concessions.141  Former 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) Administrator 
Thomas Scully recently made a similar claim in an interview with Politico, 
describing the notice-and-comment period as a sort of bargaining process: 
“You put out a proposed rule knowing that people are going to go a little 
crazy and then you come back, and they’ll be so excited and relieved that the 
final rule’s half as bad as the proposed rule was.”142  For all of these reasons, 
focusing solely on the notice-and-comment period will tend to overstate the 
influence of organizations seeking less stringent rules. 
Hypothesis 4: Businesses may be more successful in part because they 
make more limited and realistic requests. 
Finally, it is possible that business interests are more likely to receive 
their desired changes than other types of interest groups in part because they 
ask for more limited changes.  This is in line with Wagner, Barnes, and Pe-
ters’ suggestion that agencies may be more likely to reject public interest 
groups’ comments because they “were more ambitious and demanded mate-
rial changes to the rule.”143  Similarly, Cuéllar hypothesizes that more sophis-
ticated commenters may know how to make suggestions that fall within the 
scope of the rulemaking.144  Yet most of the empirical literature has been 
unable to devise a consistent way to measure the substantive significance of 
specific changes in the rule.145 
                                                          
 141.  Cary Coglianese, Outsized Influence and Unfair Outcomes? Business Involvement in the 
Regulatory Process 10 (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 142.  Running CMS: What it’s Like, and What Seema Verma May Do, POLITICO’S PULSE 
CHECK, at 19:28–19:35 (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/politicos-pulse-
check/e/running-cms-what-its-like-and-what-seema-verma-may-do-49144932.  But see Wagner, 
Barnes & Peters, supra note 13, at 148–49 (enumerating several reasons why it seems unlikely that 
agencies could perfectly anticipate industry pressure and negate it by issuing an extra-stringent pro-
posed rule).  It is possible that both of these assessments are correct: Agencies may counterbalance 
some interest group pressure through issuing an overly stringent proposed rule without negating it 
entirely.  If that is the case, then focusing solely on changes made during this stage of the rulemaking 
process will still tend to overestimate influence. 
 143.  Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 13, at 132.  But see Yackee & Yackee, supra note 
13, at 136–37 (finding no support for the hypothesis that “business commenters communicate a 
greater level of information and expertise than do other commenters”). 
 144.  Cuéllar, supra note 62, at 484–85. 
 145.  See, e.g., Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 13, at 130 n.115 (acknowledging that they 
“were not able to determine reliably whether the changes were ‘big’ or ‘little’ . . . thus, there is still 
the distinct possibility that even if there is some indication of interest group impacts on the proposed 
rule as a result of comments, whether these impacts are substantively important is unclear”).  They 
note that EPA identified the rule changes that they focus on as “significant;” but concede that “this 
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II.  CASE STUDY: THE TANK CAR RULE 
A.  Methodology 
1.  Study Design 
To investigate the four hypotheses, this Article examines a case study 
of interest group influence in the rulemaking process.  The case study focuses 
on the “Tank Car Rule” (“HM-251”)—a suite of standards jointly promul-
gated by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 
(“PHMSA”) and the Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”) in May 2015, 
in coordination with Canadian regulators.146 
Although focusing on a single rule obviously limits the generalizability 
of this study’s conclusions,147 using a case study approach has two primary 
advantages: First, it allows for a more fine-grained analysis of how interest 
groups participate in and influence the regulatory process that considers mul-
tiple dimensions of participation and influence, as well as the specific policy 
changes that they requested.148  Second, whereas most previous studies of 
influence in the rulemaking process have tended to focus on one or two stages 
of the rulemaking process (most commonly, the notice-and-comment pe-
riod), focusing on only one rule makes it possible to examine interest group 
influence over the lifecycle of the rule.149 
The major empirical component of this study involves translating the 
materials in the regulatory docket into quantitative data that can then be ana-
lyzed.  The DOT received over 3300 comments, several petitions to initiate 
a rulemaking, and a number of administrative and judicial appeals on the 
Tank Car Rule.  Some of this participation was by organized interest groups 
                                                          
may be a relative term that selects out the most important changes relative to the rest and does not 
indicate objectively that the changes are indeed important.”  Id.  One exception is Haeder & Yackee, 
supra note 13, at 513 (manually scoring rule changes during OMB review as “of minor substantive 
importance (1), moderate importance (2), or major importance (3)”). 
 146.  See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 147.  MAGAT, KRUPNICK & HARRINGTON, supra note 88, at 165 (“Without examining a large 
number of regulations, idiosyncratic factors are difficult to separate from the general influences on 
rulemaking.”). 
 148.  Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics? The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 
1495, 1561 (2005) (“Empirical studies that focus on a single type of activity, therefore, may over-
look or distort the extent of a corporation’s political involvement.  Similarly, empirical studies vir-
tually never consider more subtle forms of political influence, including lobbying and testimony by 
in-house employees, participation in the ‘revolving door’ of hiring former government officials and 
staffers, development and exploitation of relationships between corporate and political leaders, and 
corporate philanthropy.  One of the advantages of the case study methodology is that it identifies 
factors that may be omitted from broader based empirical studies.” (footnote omitted)). 
 149.  Furlong, supra note 7, at 341 (“Future research may want to look at the development of 
policies from ‘cradle to grave’ and examine interest group participation throughout.”). 
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(e.g., businesses, non-profits, etc.), while some of it (in particular, many of 
the public comments) was by individuals. 
For each public submission in the regulatory docket, I code various 
characteristics about the individual or organization and their submission, in-
cluding the organization type (e.g., individual, business, industry association, 
state/local government), what form the participation takes (e.g., comment on 
the NPRM, comment on the ANPRM, petition for rulemaking), how sophis-
ticated they were, and whether their submission appeared to be a form let-
ter.150 
I measure whether the participants’ desired rule changes were reflected 
in the final rule using two different measures: First, I code whether the overall 
stringency of one or more of the major pieces of the rule shifted in the direc-
tion the participant wanted.  Second, to the extent possible, I attempt to code 
how many discrete policy concerns each submission raised and whether the 
specific concerns it raised were reflected in the final rule.  For the latter, I try 
to count a request as being addressed in the final rule only if it was clear that 
it was completely addressed in the final rule.  To do this, I undertake a de-
tailed examination of the final rule and compare it to what the participants in 
the rulemaking process requested.  To supplement this analysis, I also con-
duct several informal interviews with government officials, industry repre-
sentatives, and non-governmental staff who were closely involved with the 
development of this rule. 
There were a number of different stages of the Tank Car Rule rulemak-
ing process, and there were opportunities at each stage for individuals and 
interest groups to participate in this process.  Figure 1 illustrates the major 
stages at which DOT issued a new version of the rule—or officially rejected 
requests to further amend the rule—as well as the ways that interest groups 












                                                          
 150.  For more detail on these categories, see Methodological Appendix. 
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FIGURE 1: OVERVIEW OF THE TANK CAR RULE RULEMAKING PROCESS 
That being said, not every issue that eventually became part of the Tank 
Car Rule was under consideration at each stage, and not every group or indi-
vidual who participated in the process did so at each stage.  Furthermore, 
there is more public information about interest groups’ participation at some 
stages than at others.  For example, whereas all petitions and public com-
ments are made available at regulations.gov, there are no public records of 
the conversations that transpired at 12,866 meetings.  Nor were these the only 
ways that interest groups participated in the Tank Car Rule process.  For ex-
ample, DOT regulators are not required to record and publish contacts that 
they had with outside groups that occurred before they issued the proposed 
rule.151 
Thus, by necessity I focus on different stages of the rulemaking process 
and use different metrics to investigate the four hypotheses enumerated 
above.152  First, I examine consensus among interest groups throughout the 
rulemaking process, primarily, but not exclusively, at the ANPRM and 
NPRM stages.  Second, to examine how different measures of influence may 
yield different results, I compare participants’ positions on the NPRM to the 
final rule.  In keeping with much of the empirical literature on this subject, I 
                                                          
 151.  See Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 13, at 112 (“The agency is required to log ex 
parte contacts in the public record only after publishing the proposed rule and generally not before.” 
(citing Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977))). 
 152.  See supra Section I.B.4; see also GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY 48 
(1994) (“Our data need not all be at the same level of analysis.  Disaggregated data, or observations 
from a different time period, or even from a different part of the world, may provide additional 
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focus on these two late stages because they yield the most documentary evi-
dence of what changes participants were asking for, as well as how DOT 
responded to those requests.  In addition, by these late stages in the rulemak-
ing process, most of the major elements of the rule were on the table, as well 
as several potential changes to the rule that were ultimately not adopted.  
Third, in contrast to much of the previous literature and in spite of the asso-
ciated measurement difficulties, I try to assess how much influence interest 
groups exert over the entire rulemaking process, from submitting petitions to 
review to filing litigation in court.  Finally, to examine whether business 
groups ask for more limited changes to the rule than other types of interest 
groups and individual members of the public, I focus on the number and type 
of concerns that they raised in their comments on the proposed rule. 
One important disclaimer is that this study does not pass judgment on 
any of the policy choices or preferences of the various government officials 
or interest groups that participated in this rulemaking process.  The focus of 
this study is on examining—to the extent possible—how interest groups par-
ticipated and to what extent they influenced the rulemaking process, not on 
whether this participation and influence ultimately led to positive or negative 
results. 
2.  Case Selection 
The Tank Car rule was selected for this case study for a few reasons: 
First, it provides a rich and complex portrait of interest group and individual 
participation in the rulemaking process, which enables me to examine differ-
ences and similarities among how interest groups and individuals engage in 
the rulemaking process.  Over 400 different interest groups—including busi-
nesses, state and local governments, and non-profit organizations—along 
with thousands of individual members of the public, participated in the rule-
making process and expressed their views on the rule to federal regulators.  
At the same time, however, the participation in the rulemaking process was 
not so overwhelming as to make manual content analysis practically impos-
sible.153 
Second, this rule illustrates the many different ways that interest groups 
can engage at different stages of the rulemaking process and how focusing 
on different stages of this process can lead to different conclusions about the 
extent and effectiveness of this participation.  Interest groups were involved 
at every stage of the development of the Tank Car Rule, from helping to 
                                                          
 153.  By contrast, a proposal by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to roll back 
“Net Neutrality” rules reportedly received 21.9 million comments.  Jon Brodkin, Net Neutrality 
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highlight the inadequacy of current regulations, formulating new standards 
that were eventually adopted in the Tank Car Rule, generating pressure to 
pass the rule, participating in the notice-and-comment process, appealing to 
PHMSA and FRA—referred to hereafter simply as the DOT—to change 
some of the requirements in the rule, challenging the rule in court, and lob-
bying Congress to amend the rule.154 
Third, the Tank Car Rule was a high-salience rule that received a sub-
stantial amount of attention from Congress, the media, and a wide range of 
different interest groups.155  Most previous empirical studies of influence in 
the rulemaking process have tended to focus on relatively less salient rule-
makings, and influence in these contexts may differ.156  Finally, since much 
of the early scholarly literature on regulatory capture focused on the regula-
tion of railroads, this seemed like a natural place to look for evidence of in-
terest group influence over the regulatory process.157 
That being said, focusing on a single high-salience rule also has disad-
vantages, as the dynamics surrounding the Tank Car Rule are unlikely to be 
representative of the rulemaking process as a whole.  Like other case studies 
of high-salience rules, this study—viewed in isolation—may give the impres-
sion that interest groups are more intensely engaged in the rulemaking pro-
cess than they actually are.158  As Kerwin and Furlong point out, many rules 
published in the federal register “are quite minor, routine, and noncontrover-
sial,” and are therefore “not likely to attract much notice from interest groups 
because their individual effects are small.”159  In particular, the amount of 
attention that the Tank Car Rule received from public interest groups and the 
general public is unrepresentative of most rulemakings.160 
B.  Rule Background 
The Tank Car Rule was a discretionary rule, issued pursuant to DOT’s 
longstanding authority under Title 49, section 5103(b) of the United States 
Code, which authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to “prescribe regula-
tions for the safe transportation, including security, of hazardous materials in 
                                                          
 154.  See infra fig.3. 
 155.  See infra Section II.B. 
 156.  See Yackee & Yackee, supra note 13, at 137. 
 157.  See, e.g., Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Rail-
roads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L. J. 467 (1952); Stigler, supra note 24; see also Nicholas 
Bagley, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (discussing agency capture of PHMSA as a 
possible explanation for the explosion of a natural-gas pipeline in California in 2010). 
 158.  KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 5, at 190 (“If we were to rely solely on case studies, we 
would immediately conclude that participation by interest groups is a prominent part of all rulemak-
ing.”). 
 159.  Id. at 191. 
 160.  See supra notes 53–62. 
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intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce.”161  The pressure to develop the 
rule began to build as the production of crude oil in the United States started 
rising sharply in 2009 and 2010, after having declined for many years.162  The 
production of crude increased by around 70% from 2010 to 2015, in large 
part due to increased drilling in shale formations (most notably the Bakken 
shale formation).163  Ethanol production in the U.S. also ramped up consid-
erably around this time.164 
Historically, most crude oil was transported via pipeline or vessel.165  
However, since there now wasn’t sufficient pipeline capacity to transport all 
this new crude oil and ethanol, shippers turned to rail as a stopgap measure.166  
According to analysis from the Association of American Railroads 
(“AAR”)—an industry trade group that focuses on the U.S. freight rail indus-
try167—the volume of crude oil transported by rail increased by 131% be-
tween 2010 and 2014.168  By 2015, DOT reported that crude oil and ethanol 
comprised around 68% of the flammable liquids transported by rail.169  The 
number of tank cars carrying ethanol grew 40% from 2008 to 2011.170  Ship-
pers increasingly employed the DOT-111—a general-purpose tank car whose 
design dates back to the 1960s—to transport this surfeit of oil and ethanol.171  
Yet, the DOT-111 car was historically used for transporting non-flammable 
                                                          
 161.  49 U.S.C. § 5103(b) (2012). 
 162.  Domestic Oil Production Reversed Decades-Long Decline in 2009 and 2010, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN.: TODAY IN ENERGY (Apr. 27, 2011), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/de-
tail.php?id=1130. 
 163.  Id.; U.S. Field Production of Crude Oil, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=mcrfpus1&f=a (last visited Mar. 
30, 2019).   
 164.  Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-
Hazard Flammable Trains, 80 Fed. Reg. 26,644, 26,645 (May 8, 2015) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 
171, 172, 173, 174, 179). 
 165.  Id. at 26,644. 
 166.  Clifford Krauss & Jad Mouawad, Accidents Surge as Oil Industry Takes the Train, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/business/energy-environment/acci-
dents-surge-as-oil-industry-takes-the-train.html. 
 167.  About Us, ASS’N OF AM. RAILROADS, https://www.aar.org/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 30, 
2020). 
 168.  BOB FRONCZAK, ASS’N OF AM. R.RS., RAIL TRANSPORT OF PETROLEUM, NATURAL GAS 
AND ETHANOL 7 (2016).  
 169.  Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-
Hazard Flammable Trains, 80 Fed. Reg. at 26,645. 
 170.  Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-
Hazard Flammable Trains, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,016, 45,030 (Aug. 1, 2014) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. 
pt. 171, 172, 173, 174, and 179). 
 171.  Jad Mouawad, Despite Orders, Federal Tank-Car Safety Measures Are Slow in Coming, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/business/despite-orders-federal-
tank-car-safety-measures-are-slow-in-coming.html.  
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hazardous materials and was “long known to be ill suited for transporting 
flammable material.”172 
Soon, there was an uptick in rail accidents involving crude oil and eth-
anol, and there were devastating consequences.  The early accidents involved 
ethanol.  In June 2009, a train carrying ethanol derailed near Cherry Valley, 
Illinois, killing one passenger and injuring several persons.173  The release of 
ethanol from the train and the resulting fire prompted a mandatory evacuation 
of 600 residences and resulted in around $7.9 million of damage.174  Acci-
dents involving crude oil began to pile up, too, going from zero accidents in 
2010 to five in 2013.175  From 1975 to 2012, railroads spilled 800,000 gallons 
of crude oil, and in 2013 alone, they spilled 1.15 million gallons.176  In its 
findings stemming from its investigation of the Cherry Valley derailment, the 
National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”)—an independent govern-
ment body charged with investigating and reporting on civil transportation 
accidents—determined that the DOT-111 “can almost always be expected to 
breach in derailments that involve pileups or multiple car-to-car impacts.”177  
NTSB filed several petitions with PHMSA urging it to update its safety stand-
ards.178 
Members of Congress also sent letters to FRA and PHMSA, “urging 
prompt, responsive actions.”179  Around the same time as the NTSB was fo-
cusing on this issue, the AAR’s Tank Car Committee—a self-regulatory body 
with representation from the railroad industry, the shipping industry, and the 
car owner/manufacturing industry that studies the railroad industry and helps 
to set standards for railroads—created a task force in 2011 to study how to 
reduce the risk of these events.180  Ultimately, this Committee came up with 
                                                          
 172.  Id.; Jad Mouawad, New Oil Train Rules Are Hit from All Sides, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/02/business/energy-environment/us-sets-new-rules-for-oil-
shipments-by-rail.html. 
 173.  NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, ACCIDENT REPORT: DERAILMENT OF CN 
FREIGHT TRAIN U70691–18 WITH SUBSEQUENT HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RELEASE AND FIRE, 
CHERRY VALLEY, ILLINOIS, JUNE 19, 2009 1 (2012). 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  See 79 Fed. Reg. at 45,019. 
 176.  Krauss & Mouawad, supra note 166. 
 177.  Deborah A.P. Hersman, Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., Safety Recommendation Letter (Mar. 2, 
2012), at 2. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  79 Fed. Reg. at 45,026. 
 180.  Petition of Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. to Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Admin., Petition 
for Rulemaking: Tank Car Standards for DOT Class 111 Tank Cars Used for Packing Group I and 
II Materials (Mar. 9, 2011); see 49 C.F.R. pts. 171, 172, 173, 174, 179 (2015). 
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a specification for a new standard, the CPC-1232, which increased the thick-
ness of the tank car shell.181  The AAR, on behalf of the committee, petitioned 
PHMSA to adopt these standards.182 
DOT recognized that the new industry standards improved on the old 
DOT-111 design, but it argued that these improvements did not go far enough 
and suggested a number of additional safety features.183  As a result, the Tank 
Car Committee put together a task force with representation from FRA, 
AAR, and the ethanol and oil industries which considered a number of addi-
tional safety requirements, but the committee failed to arrive at a consen-
sus.184  The DOT decided to move forward with a rulemaking process to put 
the new standards in place anyway, but the effort stalled amidst concerns that 
the regulation’s costs would outweigh its benefits.185 
Then, on July 6, 2013, a train of DOT-111 tank cars filled with crude oil 
from the Bakken Formation in North Dakota derailed and exploded in a small 
Quebec town called Lac-Mégantic, killing at least forty-two people and in-
cinerating much of the town’s infrastructure.186  In the following weeks and 
months, members of Congress ratcheted up pressure on the White House and 
federal regulators to respond, while the NTSB issued several more recom-
mendations to PHMSA and FRA.187  Deborah Hersman, the former chair-
woman of the NTSB, ominously warned in 2014 that not updating the stand-
ards could result in a “higher body count.”188 
This pressure helped to jumpstart DOT’s heretofore-moribund regula-
tory initiative.  Only a few months later, on September 6, 2013, the FRA and 
PHMSA issued an ANPRM seeking comment on several petitions for rule-
making, among them the petition that the AAR Tank Car Committee had 
                                                          
 181.  79 Fed. Reg. at 45,030. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id.; PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., T87.6 TASK FORCE SUMMARY 
REPORT (2013). 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Telephone Interview with Government Official (March 3, 2017) (conducted on condition 
of anonymity). 
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 188.  Mouawad, supra note 171. 
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submitted back in 2011.189  FRA and PHMSA then worked together to de-
velop a more comprehensive set of rules geared at improving safety for the 
transportation of flammable liquids by rail and ushering it through the notice-
and-comment process.  The rulemaking process occupied another year and a 
half, and on May 8, 2015, DOT issued the final version of HM-251, the Tank 
Car Rule.190 
The final rule is wide-ranging and touches on a wide array of regulatory 
issues, including instituting new tank design standards, speed restrictions, 
braking technologies, and notification requirements.  In the preamble to the 
final rule, DOT summarizes thirteen different main issues that it considered 
in developing the final rule191: 
1.  Harmonization 
The DOT developed the Tank Car Rule in consultation with Transport 
Canada (the Canadian government agency responsible for transportation reg-
ulations), and the Tank Car Rule attempts to harmonize the U.S. regulations 
with Canada’s regulations “[t]o the extent possible,” but it does not fully har-
monize some provisions, such as the brake requirements and speed limits.192 
2.  Definition of High-Hazard Flammable Train 
The regulation defines certain trains carrying large volumes of flamma-
ble liquids as “high-hazard flammable trains” (“HHFTs”) and applies certain 
parts of the regulation—the speed limits, braking restrictions, and routing re-
quirements—only to trains that meet this definition.193  The final rule defines 
an HHFT as “a single train transporting [twenty] or more loaded tank cars 
containing Class 3 flammable liquid in a continuous block or a single train 
carrying [thirty-five] or more loaded tank cars of a Class 3 flammable liquid 
throughout the train consist.”194 
                                                          
 189.  Hazardous Materials: Rail Petitions and Recommendations to Improve the Safety of Rail-
road Tank Car Transportation (RRR), 78 Fed. Reg. 54,849, 54,850-54,851 (Sept. 6, 2013) (to be 
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 173, 174, 178, 179,180). 
 190.  Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-
Hazard Flammable Trains, 80 Fed. Reg. 26,644, 26,645 (May 8, 2015) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 
171, 172, 173, 174, and 179). 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. at 26,662. 
 193.  Id. at 26,663–26,664. 
 194.  Id. at 26,664. 
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3.  Crude Oil Treatment 
The NPRM had explored the idea of requiring that crude oil be “pre-
treated” so that it is less volatile before being transported, but the final rule 
does not require pre-treatment of crude oil.195 
4.  Scope of Rulemaking 
The DOT received a number of requests to expand the proposals in the 
rule beyond flammable liquids to all hazardous materials, but the final rule 
applies only to flammable liquids.196 
5.  New Tank Car Construction 
The NPRM proposed three possible sets of safety features (such as in-
creased shell thickness, thermal protection systems, etc.) for new tank cars, 
ranging from most stringent to least stringent.197  The final rule adopts the 
intermediate option.198 
6.  Retrofit Standard 
The final rule requires that existing tank cars be retrofitted only to meet 
the least stringent of the three options proposed in the NPRM.199 
7.  Performance Standard 
To encourage innovation in tank car design, the final rule provides that 
tank cars can be designed in different ways as long as they meet certain per-
formance criteria.200 
8.  Implementation Timeline 
The rule provides a “risk-based” timeline over which existing tank cars 
must be retrofitted, taking into account the material they are transporting and 
the type of tank car.201 
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9.  Speed Restrictions 
The final rule adopts a forty mile-per-hour speed limit in “High-Threat 
Urban Areas” (defined as “an area comprising one or more cities and sur-
rounding areas including a [ten]-mile buffer zone”).202 
10.  Advanced Brake Signal Propagation Systems 
The final rule requires all HHFTs to have an end-of-train or distributed 
power braking system, and requires a subset of HHFTs meeting the definition 
of a “high-hazard flammable unit train” (defined as “a train comprised of 
[seventy] or more loaded tank cars containing Class 3 flammable liquids trav-
eling speeds at greater than [thirty miles-per-hour]”) to be equipped with an 
electronically controlled pneumatic (“ECP”) braking system when transport-
ing flammable liquids.203 
11.  Classification 
The rule requires shippers to adopt a sampling and testing program for 
unrefined-petroleum products.204 
12.  Routing 
The rule requires railroad companies to perform an analysis that consid-
ers at least twenty-seven specified safety and security factors when they are 
making routing decisions.205 
13.  Notification 
The rule requires railroads to identify a point of contact on routing issues 
and to provide that information to state and local officials in affected juris-
dictions.206 
Even after the Tank Car Rule was finalized in May 2015, the rule con-
tinued to evolve, and interest groups continued to lobby for further changes 
to the rule.  Within weeks of DOT’s issuing the final rule, several interest 
groups filed administrative appeals with DOT and submitted petitions for ju-
dicial review in the federal courts of appeals.  DOT rejected all of the admin-
istrative appeals in November 2015.207  However, the following month, Con-
gress passed the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (“FAST”) Act, a 
wide-ranging transportation funding and authorization law that—among 
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many other things—made several important amendments to the Tank Car 
Rule, which I discuss below.208  DOT issued a regulation codifying many of 
these changes in August 2016.209   
C.  Findings 
1.  Consensus Among Interest Groups 
Hypothesis 1: Businesses may take very different positions on 
regulatory issues, even when they are broadly in favor of less 
regulation. 
Table 1 shows that in their comments on the proposed rule, many oth-
erwise diverse interest groups are nevertheless internally unified in their re-
spective positions as to whether they desired the Tank Car Rule to become 
more or less stringent.  The vast majority of comments were submitted by (in 
order of most comments to least comments): individual members of the pub-
lic, individual businesses, state or local governments, public interest groups 
(groups concerned with issues of general welfare such as the environment or 
consumer protection), and industry associations.  In line with the existing 
literature (which mostly focuses on comments at the NPRM stage), I find that 
businesses, industry associations, public interest groups, and members of the 
public all display internal cohesiveness, with businesses and industry associ-
ations predominantly seeking less stringent regulations and public interest 
groups and individuals seeking more stringent regulations.210  State and local 
governments were slightly more divided, but most of them (76.64%) sought 











                                                          
 208.  See infra notes 274–276. 
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 210.  See, e.g., Yackee & Yackee, supra note 13, at 132 (finding that over 83% of business com-
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Individual 2713 89.31 0.66 0.18 9.77 0.07 
Business 225 2.67 89.78 0.44 1.78 4.89 
State/Local 137 76.64 17.52 0.73 1.46 3.65 
Industry 
Association 63 3.17 80.95 0 3.17 12.70 
Public 
Interest 58 81.03 3.45 5.17 8.62 1.72 
Congress 12 66.67 16.67 8.33 0 8.33 
Native 
American 7 100 0 0 0 0 
Labor 6 83.33 0 16.67 0 0 
Other 4 100 0 0 0 0 
Academic 3 33.33 0 0 66.67 0 
Other  
Fed. Gov. 3 100 0 0 0 0 
 
However, industry associations and businesses were both less unified 
with respect to their positions on the ANPRM, with substantial fractions of 
industry associations and businesses calling for the existing regulatory re-
gime to become more stringent, at least in some respects.211  This suggests, 
in line with the account offered above,212 that a substantial fraction of the 
business community viewed the regulations governing the transportation of 
                                                          
 211.  See infra tbl.2. 
 212.  See supra notes 180–182 and accompanying text. 
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flammable liquids by rail that were in place before the Tank Car Rule as in-
adequate, even though most of them ultimately viewed the standards in the 
Tank Car Rule NPRM as having gone too far.213 
 
























Individual 16 62.50 6.25 0 31.25 0 
State/Local 29 89.66 0 6.90 3.45 0 
Industry  
Association 14 7.14 57.14 0 14.29 21.43 
Business 9 22.22 44.44 0 11.11 22.22 
Public  
Interest 9 100 0 0 0 0 
Congress 2 100 0 0 0 0 
Labor 2 100 0 0 0 0 
Other  
Fed. Gov.  2 50 0 50 0 0 
 
Moreover, although businesses and industry groups may have been rel-
atively united in their overall position on the stringency of the rule throughout 
the rulemaking process, they held quite different views on some important 
specific aspects of the rule.  In particular, the interests of railroad companies 
and tank car manufacturers sharply diverged with those of the shippers of 
goods (such as oil and ethanol companies) and the owners of tank car equip-
ment.  Because railroad companies do not own the tank cars that they 
transport (these cars are usually owned by either the shippers or the tank car 
manufacturers) but do have liability in the event of a rail accident, they are 
generally in favor of more rigid tank car standards.214  Railroad companies 
                                                          
 213.  See supra Section II.B. 
 214.  Compare Joan Lowy, Influence Game: Shaping Railroad Safety Rules, WASH. EXAMINER 
(July 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/influence-game-shaping-railroad-safety-
rules/article/2148796 (“The [AAR], for example, is pushing for tougher safety standards for tank 
cars than the current, voluntary standards agreed to by industry in 2011.  Railroads, though, typically 
don’t own or lease tank cars and so wouldn’t have to buy new cars or retrofit existing ones.  The oil 
and ethanol industries that own the cars want to stick with the voluntary standards, also known as 
‘1232’ tank cars.”), with Daniel Machalaba, Railroads Push to Harden Tank Cars—Some Chemical 
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thus had been lobbying DOT for stricter regulation of tank cars since well 
before the Tank Car Rule was issued.215 
Although shippers and railroads aligned on certain issues in the pro-
posed rule (such as the brake requirement and speed restrictions), they di-
verged on others.  For example, in its comments on the proposed rule, the 
AAR “urge[d] PHMSA to adopt an aggressive phase-out schedule for cars 
that cannot meet retrofit requirements.”216  Likewise, tank car manufacturers, 
such as Greenbrier Companies, “encourage[d] PHMSA to finalize a rule for 
new cars and retrofits of existing cars that permits the industry to make these 
changes as rapidly as possible.”217 
By contrast, shippers and owners of tank cars were in general more re-
sistant to imposing retrofit requirements for existing tank cars.  For example, 
the Railway Supply Institute (the industry association representing freight car 
owners) warned in its comments that “PHMSA’s [p]roposed [m]odification 
[t]imeline [c]annot be [a]chieved [b]ased on [r]epair [n]etwork [f]acility 
[c]onstraints and [d]oes [n]ot [a]ccount for [s]everal [u]nintended [c]onse-
quences.”218  Similarly, the American Petroleum Institute (the largest indus-
try association representing oil and gas companies) complained that 
“PHMSA’s proposed phase-out is highly ambitious and only works when 
there are very optimistic assumptions.”219 
These differences continued to play out at later stages of the rulemaking 
process.  For example, after DOT finalized the Tank Car Rule, AAR submit-
ted an administrative appeal to DOT, among other things, arguing that the 
rule should be expanded to apply to all cars carrying Class 3 flammable liq-
uids—regardless of their number or arrangement on the train—and that DOT 
                                                          
Makers Balk at Cost of Overhaul, Sought Following Deadly Accidents, WALL. ST. J. (Sept. 18, 
2006) (noting that “the redesigns are fiercely opposed by some chemical companies, which see little 
more than a push to shift expenses and liability away from railroads”). 
 215.  Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., Comments Before the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Ad-
ministration, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251): Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car 
Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains 1 (Sept. 30, 2014) (“In 
2011, AAR petitioned PHMSA to adopt new tank car standards for packing group I and II materials, 
including flammable liquids.  In comments responding to the 2013 ANPRM, AAR endorsed new 
tank car standards for all class 3 flammable liquids, including those classified as packing group III.  
AAR strongly supports new tank car standards for all class 3 flammable liquids.”). 
 216.  Id. at 41. 
 217.  Greenbrier Cos., Inc., Comments Before the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Ad-
ministration, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251) Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car 
Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains 13–14 (Aug. 1, 2014). 
 218.  Thomas D. Simpson, President, Railway Supply Inst., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule 
for Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard 
Flammable Trains, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251), at 25 (Sept. 30, 2014). 
 219.  Robert L. Greco, III, Grp. Dir., Am. Petroleum Inst., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule 
for Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard 
Flammable Trains, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251), at 22 (Sept. 30, 2014). 
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should mandate that all tank cars carrying flammable liquids be equipped 
with new safety requirements.220 
These demands contrasted with those of the shippers.  Although the 
American Petroleum Institute (representing oil companies) had supported 
thermal blankets and pressure relief devices in its comments on the NPRM, 
it did not mention either of these issues in its appeal;221  Growth Energy (rep-
resenting ethanol companies) argued that the new tank car and retrofit stand-
ards should exclude ethanol;222 by contrast, the American Chemistry Council 
(representing American chemical manufacturers) argued that PHMSA should 
narrow the scope of the rule so that it applied only to crude oil and ethanol.223 
These different views made for some strange bedfellows.  For instance, 
on some of the issues in its administrative appeal, AAR was in alignment 
with a coalition of environmental groups and local governments who also 
sued DOT, and who were similarly pushing DOT to expand the scope of the 
rule and impose the same safety features.224  In addition, interviews with gov-
ernment officials involved in the rulemaking process also suggest that the 
AAR’s desire for more stringent regulations were actually in line with the 
views of at least some regulators, even though these officials ultimately did 
not feel they were able to include such provisions in the final rule.225 
The AAR’s support for stricter standards likely resulted in the Tank Car 
Rule being more stringent than it otherwise would have been.  For instance, 
Congress ended up amending Tank Car Rule to include some of the safety 
features for which AAR had advocated,226 and to expand the scope of the 
                                                          
 220.  See Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., supra note 215, at 40–41; see also Eric de Place, Why New Im-
proved Oil Trains Are Not Nearly Good Enough, SIGHTLINE INST. (Jan. 28, 2015) http://www.sight-
line.org/2015/01/28/why-new-improved-oil-trains-are-not-nearly-good-enough/.  
 221.  Greco, supra note 219, at 28. 
 222.  Tom Buis, Chief Exec. Officer, Growth Energy, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for 
Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard 
Flammable Trains, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251), at 4 (Mar. 13, 2015). 
 223.  Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Controls and Operational Controls for High 
Hazard Flammable Trains, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,952, 71,954 (Nov. 18, 2015). 
 224.  See, e.g., Earthjustice, Forest Ethics, Sierra Club, Nat’l Res. Def. Council, & Oil Change 
Int’l, Comments Before the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Docket No. 
PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251): Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Opera-
tional Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains 21 (Sept. 30, 2014) (“We strongly oppose al-
lowing unsafe tank cars, including any DOT-111s or CPC-1232 tank cars, to continue to be used to 
ship crude oil and ethanol in any configuration unless retrofitted, including in blocks of fewer than 
[twenty] cars.”) 
 225.  Telephone Interview with Government Official (March 29, 2017) (conducted on condition 
of anonymity). 
 226.  See, e.g., Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 7305, 129 
Stat. 1312, 1597 (2015) (Thermal Blankets) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 20155). 
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retrofit requirements.227  Shortly thereafter, the coalition of environmental 
petitioners and local governments dropped their lawsuit.228  
2.  Different Measures of Influence 
Hypothesis 2: Businesses may often not receive their desired rule 
changes, even when the stringency of the rule shifts in the direction 
that they desire. 
I use two strategies for measuring influence during the notice-and-com-
ment process: First, I code whether each commenter asked for one or more 
of the thirteen “major” issues highlighted above to become more stringent, 
less stringent, or stay the same; then I code whether that part of the rule ac-
tually became more or less stringent, or stayed the same, from the proposed 
rule stage to the final rule stage.229  Cases where the desired rule change 
matched the actual change are coded as a “1,” whereas cases where the de-
sired rule change did not match the actual change are coded as “0.”  The 
commenter’s overall influence is measured as the mean of these values across 
each commenter type (labeled “Influence 1” in Figure 2 below). 
Second, I code the proportion of policy concerns raised in each com-
ment that were completely addressed in the final rule, either because the spe-
cific part of the rule that they objected to was removed from the rule or be-
cause the revision that they suggested was fully adopted.230  The commenter’s 
overall influenced is measured as the proportion of policy concerns that were 
completely addressed across each commenter type (labeled “Influence 2” in 
Figure 2 below).  
As in other empirical studies of influence which rely on content analy-
sis, neither of these measures is causal; they both only report associations 
between desired rule changes and changes in the actual rule.  Because my 
goal is to examine the differences among different measures of influence, 
rather than to quantify precisely which interest groups had the most influence 
in this rule, I report only bivariate correlations below for the five most-repre-
sented categories of commenters.  
                                                          
 227.  Id. at § 7304 (Phase-Out of All Tank Cars Used to Transport Class 3 Flammable Liquids) 
(to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 20155). 
 228.  Linda Chiem, DC Circ. Urged to Put Off Oil Train Safety Rule Challenge, LAW 360 (Mar. 
22, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/774926/dc-circ-urged-to-put-off-oil-train-safety-rule-
challenge (noting that environmental groups dropped their petition for judicial review of the Tank 
Car Rule). 
 229.  Intercoder reliability scores for the variable that recorded the number of issues that were 
addressed in the final rule were somewhat weak.  The percent agreement was nearly 72% when 
counting all observations, but only 49% when counting only non-form letters.  For more detail on 
these categories, see the Methodological Appendix. 
 230.  For more detail on these categories, see the Methodological Appendix. 
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Using the first measure of influence, the businesses appear to wield dis-
proportionate influence during the notice-and-comment stage of the rulemak-
ing process, compared to individuals, public interest organizations, and state 
and local governments.231  This is not entirely surprising: Business comment-
ers overwhelmingly preferred a less stringent rule,232 and a plurality of major 
pieces of the rule became less stringent than more stringent from the proposed 
to the final rule stage.233  Of the thirteen major categories in the rule, five 
became less stringent or adopted the least stringent of the options presented 
in the proposed rule: The timeline over which the DOT-111 tank cars are to 
be phased out is less ambitious, the scope is narrower, the retrofit standard is 
the least stringent of the options proposed, the speed restriction is the least 
stringent of the options proposed, and the braking requirement applies to 
fewer trains.  The remaining eight major issues in the rule either did not no-
ticeably change or became more stringent in some respects and less so in 
others.234 
 
FIGURE 2: INFLUENCE DURING THE NOTICE-AND-COMMENT PROCESS 
 
                                                          
 231.  Infra fig.2.  Figures 2 and 4 separate out businesses from industry associations to see if 
they have different levels of influence, whereas Figures 3 and 5 combine them to make the presen-
tation more straightforward. 
 232.  See supra tbl.1. 
 233.  See Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for 
High-Hazard Flammable Trains, 80 Fed. Reg. 26,644, 26,647–26,648 (May 8, 2015) (to be codified 
at 49 C.F.R. pts. 171, 172, 173, 174, 179) 














Individual Public Interest State/Local
Government
Average Percentage of Influential Comment Requests
Influence 1 Influence 2
 
746 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:700 
Using the second measure of influence, industry associations still appear 
to wield more influence than individuals and public interest groups, but the 
gap among the different types of interest groups narrows substantially.235  Ac-
cording to this measure, businesses actually exhibit less influence than public 
interest groups, while individuals exert virtually no influence during the no-
tice-and-comment process according to both measures of influence.236 
As expected, the second measure of influence is also almost uniformly 
lower than the first measure,237 indicating that most of the time in which a 
major piece of the rule moved in the direction that the commenter requested, 
the commenter usually did not receive the specific change that he or she was 
asking for.  For example, one widely circulated form letter submitted by busi-
nesses cautioned that “any brake-system requirements that may affect speed 
restrictions should be limited to proven technology”238—a clear reference to 
the ECP brake requirement in the Tank Car Rule NPRM, which businesses 
repeatedly criticized as unproven technology.239  Although the brake require-
ment became less strict from the proposed rule to the final rule, businesses’ 
request was ultimately not granted, as the brake requirement was included in 
the final rule.240 
How to interpret the disparity between these two measures is unclear.  
On the one hand, this disparity could be viewed as evidence that even the 
most influential interest groups usually do not get exactly what they want in 
                                                          
 235.  See supra fig.2. 
 236.  This latter finding aligns with Cuéllar’s research, which examines three rules and finds that 
the average number of accepted suggestions made by individual members of the public was 0.01, 
0.00, and 0.02, respectively.  Cuéllar, supra note 62, at 462. 
 237.  See supra fig.2. 
 238.  See, e.g., Mike Gray, Exec. Vice President, Caljet of America LLC, Comment Letter on 
Proposed Rule for Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls 
for High-Hazard Flammable Trains, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251), at 1 (Sept. 30, 
2014). 
 239.  See, e.g., David Schaper, Battle Over New Oil Train Standards Pits Safety Against Cost, 
NPR (June 19, 2015, 3:30 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/06/19/414615187/battle-over-new-oil-
train-standards-pits-safety-against-cost (“AAR’s President Ed Hamberger discussed the problems 
the railroads have with the new rules in an interview with NPR prior to filing the appeal.  ‘The one 
that we have real problems with is requiring something called ECP brakes—electronically con-
trolled pneumatic brakes,’ he said, adding the new braking system that the federal government is 
mandating is unproven.”). 
 240.  In the proposed rule, all tank cars built after October 1, 2015 for use in an HHFT travelling 
above thirty miles-per-hour would have had to be equipped with ECP brakes.  See Hazardous Ma-
terials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains, 
79 Fed. Reg. 45,016, 45,077 (Aug. 1, 2014) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 171, 172, 173, 174, 179).  
However, the final rule only requires “high-hazard flammable unit trains” transporting certain types 
of flammable liquids (a subset of HHFTs) to have ECP brakes by January 1, 2021.  See Hazardous 
Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable 
Trains, 80 Fed. Reg. 26,644, 26,749 (May 8, 2015) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 171, 172, 173, 
174, 179). 
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the notice-and-comment process.  On the other hand, it could be viewed as 
evidence that interest groups treat the public comment process in bargaining 
terms and deliberately request ambitious changes that they know are unlikely 
to be granted, in the hope that more ambitious requests will be more likely to 
change the rule in the direction they desire.  Either way, it presents a more 
limited picture of interest group influence in this rule: More often than not, 
even the most influential interest groups did not get precisely the changes that 
they asked for in the final rule. 
3.  Influence over the Course of the Rulemaking Process 
Hypothesis 3: Focusing on changes made during the notice-and-
comment period may overstate business influence. 
Interest groups participated in the Tank Car Rule rulemaking process in 
several other ways besides submitting a comment on the NPRM: submitting 
petitions for rulemaking before the DOT had even begun developing a rule, 
commenting on the ANPR, participating in meetings with OIRA, and appeal-
ing the final rule either through the DOT’s administrative appeal process or 
in court.241 
Evaluating the effects of this participation at these other stages is more 
difficult than doing so at the NPRM stage for two reasons: First, only a subset 
of issues ultimately incorporated into the Tank Car Rule were discussed at 
these stages.  Second, for some of these stages, such as the OIRA review 
process or ex parte meetings (i.e., “off the record” meetings) with outside 
groups, there is little documentation about what interest groups were request-
ing (indeed, DOT did not possess any documentation of ex parte contacts in 
this rule, so I do not consider these contacts below).242  For these reasons, 
most of the empirical literature does not attempt to measure influence over 
all of these stages of the rulemaking process.  Nevertheless, I attempt to eval-
uate influence at these other stages to the extent possible below by comparing 









                                                          
 241.  Infra fig.3. 
 242.  Telephone Interview with Dep’t of Transp. Hazardous Materials Info. Ctr. (Jan. 2017).  
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FIGURE 3: PARTICIPATION IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 
 
 
The earliest documentation of interest groups’ positions on the Tank Car 
Rule comes from the petitions they submitted urging PHMSA to issue a rule.  
The Tank Car Rule ANPRM makes reference to twelve petitions for rule-
making: seven from different industry associations (four of which did not 
address the regulations governing the transportation of flammable liquids by 
rail, the subject of the Tank Car Rule), four from the NTSB, and one from a 
coalition of local governments.243  Of note, all of the petitions that were di-
rectly relevant to the Tank Car Rule (including those from industry associa-
tions) called for safety standards that were stronger than the status quo.244  
Again, this suggests that these industry groups viewed the regulatory regime 
that pre-dated the Tank Car Rule as inadequate, even though the standards 
that were ultimately adopted in the rule went beyond what some of them 
would have liked.245 
Comparing their petitions to the final version of the Tank Car Rule re-
veals that the final rule is more stringent in several respects than what the 
industry associations asked for: 
• First, although several industry associations, including the AAR and the 
American Petroleum Institute, submitted petitions in 2011 calling for 
                                                          
 243.  Hazardous Materials: Rail Petitions and Recommendations to Improve the Safety of Rail-
road Tank Car Transportation (RRR), 78 Fed. Reg. 54,849, 54,850–54,851 (Sept. 6, 2013) (to be 
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 173, 174, 178, 179, 180). 
 244.  Id. 
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new safety standards for DOT-111 tank cars carrying crude oil and 
ethanol, the standards that ended up being adopted for new tank cars 
in the final rule are more stringent than those these groups initially 
endorsed.246 
• Second, the industries focused exclusively on raising standards for 
newly constructed tank cars, but they either “recommend[ed] no mod-
ification or retrofit for existing [tank] cars,” or argued that any retrofit 
requirements be addressed in a separate rulemaking.247  By contrast, 
the NTSB argued that new safety standards must also be applied to 
the existing DOT-111 tank car fleet.248 (This recommendation was 
endorsed by the coalition of local governments.)249  DOT ultimately 
required that some existing tank cars be retrofitted in accordance with 
the standards presented in the AAR Tank Car Committee’s petition, 
the least stringent retrofit standard considered in the proposed rule.250 
• Third, the scope of the final rule was ultimately greater than the industry 
petitions: Whereas several trade associations recommended that the 
new standards be limited only to (or at least prioritize) tank cars car-
rying ethanol and crude oil,251 the final rule applied to tank cars car-
rying other kinds of flammable liquids as well.252   
• Finally, the rule included a number of other requirements that industry 
groups did not call for in their petitions, including speed restrictions, 
requirements to adopt new brake technology, routing requirements, 
and new rules to ensure the proper classification of products being 
                                                          
 246.  See supra notes 182–183 discussing AAR’s proposed tank car specification called the 
CPC-1232; see also Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls 
for High-Hazard Flammable Trains, 80 Fed. Reg. 26,644, 26,669 (May 8, 2015) (to be codified at 
49 C.F.R. pts. 171, 172, 173, 174, 179) (comparing PHMSA’s chosen requirements for new tank 
cars to an “enhanced” CPC-1232 standard). 
 247.  Petition of Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., supra note 180, at 2; see Hazardous Materials: Rail Peti-
tions and Recommendations to Improve the Safety of Railroad Tank Car Transportation, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 54,849 (Sept. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 173, 174, 178, 179, and 180). 
 248.  See Deborah A.P. Hersman, Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., Safety Recommendation Letter 
(Mar. 2, 2012), at 1, 6. 
 249.  Petition of Vill. of Barrington, Ill. & The Reg’l Answer to Canadian Nation to Pipeline & 
Hazardous Materials Safety Admin., Petition for Rulemaking: Tank Car Standards for the Existing 
Fleet of DOT Class 111 Tank Cars Used for Packing Group I and II Materials; and Real-Time 
Electronic Freight Consist Distribution 1–2 (Apr. 3, 2012) (“[A]s the National Transportation Safety 
Board (‘NTSB’) has observed, AAR’s proposed rule doesn’t go far enough as it fails to encompass 
the existing fleet of DOT-111 tank cars used to transport Groups I and II materials.”). 
 250.  80 Fed. Reg. at 26,647. 
 251.  See, e.g., Robert L. Greco, III, supra note 219, at 30. 
 252.  See 80 Fed. Reg. at 26,689 (“By defining a HHFT as a train with a continuous block of 20 
or more tank cars or a total of 35 or more tank cars containing a Class 3 flammable liquid, we 
address the specific risks of increasing crude oil and ethanol production while also anticipating the 
potential for future risks presented by the increased production or transport of other Class 3 flam-
mable liquids.”). 
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shipped by rail.253  That being said, some of the requirements that ul-
timately ended up being adopted in the final rule were less strict than 
those that DOT considered in the proposed rule. 
The standards that were ultimately adopted gave the NTSB and the co-
alition of local governments, both of which supported additional safety 
measures, much—though not all—of what they asked for in their petitions.  
The final rule promulgated by DOT addressed two of the four NTSB recom-
mendations considered in the ANPRM (three of which were endorsed by the 
coalition of local governments),254 and Congress later amended the rule to 
adopt NTSB’s third recommendation (requiring railroads to provide emer-
gency responders with real-time information about the identity and location 
of hazardous materials on trains).255 
The next stage of the rulemaking process for which there are materials 
in the regulatory docket is the ANPRM comment period.  Figure 4 shows 
that, in contrast to the findings of most of the empirical literature, when one 
looks at this stage of the comment process, state and local governments were 
the most likely to have their policy concerns in these comments addressed in 
the final rule, with businesses and industry associations, as well as public 
interest organizations and individuals, much less likely to do so.256 
                                                          
 253.  See Petition of Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., supra note 247. 
 254.  80 Fed. Reg. at 26,660. 
 255.  Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 7302, 129 Stat. 1312, 
1597 (2015) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 20155). 
 256.  Because the first measure of influence relies on coding whether each commenter asked for 
one or more of the thirteen “major” issues highlighted in the final rule to become more stringent 
(see supra text accompanying note 229), less stringent, or stay the same, and because these issues 
were not defined at this early stage of the rulemaking process, I can only use the second measure of 
influence. 
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FIGURE 4: PROPORTION OF POLICY CONCERNS IN ANPRM 
COMMENTS ADDRESSED IN THE FINAL RULE 
 
The overwhelming success of state and local governments257 is some-
what misleading, however, since it is due in large part to the fact that the 
majority of their comments were form letters, which raised a single request 
that ended up being reflected in the final rule (that DOT issue new regulations 
to retrofit existing DOT-111 tank cars used to transport certain classes of 
flammable liquids).  When these form letters are removed, state and local 
governments are still the most successful type of interest group but see less 
than half of their suggestions granted in the final rule.  The success rate of 
public interest organizations also falls somewhat with the removal of form 
letters, from roughly 29% to roughly 22%. 
In addition to commenting on the proposed rule, interest groups also 
participated in the OIRA review process—both before the proposed rule was 
issued, as well as between when the proposed rule was issued and the final 
rule was promulgated.  Of the thirty-four meetings that OIRA held with out-
side organizations about the Tank Car Rule, eighteen were called by busi-
nesses, thirteen by industry associations, two by public interest groups, and 
one by a labor group.258  Although there are no transcripts of what transpired 
in these meetings, the OIRA review process appears to have resulted in few 
substantive changes to the rule, aside from some adjustments to the imple-
mentation timeline.  Most of the documented changes between the draft final 
                                                          
 257.  Supra fig.4. 
 258.  Meetings are categorized according to who is listed as having requested the meeting on 
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoHistoricReport.  Some meetings had participants from multi-
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rule submitted to OIRA and the final rule were modifications to DOT’s jus-
tifications and analyses of the requirements in the rule.259   
After DOT issued the final rule, six interest groups (four industry asso-
ciations—the Dangerous Goods Advisory Council,260 the American Chemis-
try Council,261 the AAR,262 and the American Fuel and Petrochemical Man-
ufacturers263—one coalition of environmental groups and local 
governments,264 and one coalition of Native American Tribes265) submitted 
appeals through DOT’s administrative appeal process on a variety of differ-
ent issues.  DOT rejected all but one of these appeals, which was with-
drawn.266  That being said, the coalition of environmental and government 
groups’ appeal did prompt DOT to announce that the notification requirement 
in the Tank Car Rule did not supersede the previous notification requirements 
                                                          
 259.  See Substantive Differences between Final Rule Submitted to OIRA on February 5, 2015 
and Published in the Federal Register on May 8, 2015 (June 15, 2015) (summarizing the changes in 
the final rule that were made during OIRA review). 
 260.  The Dangerous Goods Advisory Council describes itself as “an international, non-profit 
educational organization that promotes safe and efficient transportation of hazardous materials in 
domestic and international commerce” whose membership “includes hazmat shippers, carriers, 
trade associations, and providers of related goods and services such as packaging, test labs, labels, 
warehousing facilities, freight forwarding, software, and consultants and trainers.”  DANGEROUS 
GOODS ADVISORY COUNCIL, http://www.dgac.org/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2017). 
 261.  The American Chemistry Council describes itself as an association representing “a diverse 
set of companies engaged in the business of chemistry.”  About the American Chemistry Council, 
AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, https://www.americanchemistry.com/About/ (last visited Dec. 22, 
2017).  
 262.  See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 263.   AFPM describes itself as “[t]he leading trade association representing the makers of the 
fuels that keep Americans moving and the petrochemicals that are the essential building blocks for 
modern life.” About AFPM, AM. FUEL & PETROCHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS, 
https://www.afpm.org/about-afpm/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2019).  
 264.  Namely, the Village of Barrington and City of Aurora, Illinois, join Earthjustice, Sierra 
Club, ForestEthics, Waterkeeper Alliance, Riverkeeper, Washington Environmental Council, 
Friends of the Columbia Gorge, Spokane Riverkeeper, Center for Biological Diversity, and Scenic 
Hudson.  Earthjustice, Withdrawal of Administrative Appeal of the Final Rule: “Hazardous Mate-
rials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains,” 
Docket No. PHMSA 2012-0082 (HM-251), 80 Fed. Reg. 26,644 (May 8, 2015) (June 12, 2015). 
 265.  Namely, the Umatilla, Yakama, Warm Springs, and Nez Perce tribes, and the Quinault 
Indian Nation.  Brent H. Hall et al., Appeal to the Secretary: “Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank 
Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains,” Docket No. PHMSA 
2012-0082 (HM-251), 80 Fed. Reg. 26,644 (May 8, 2015) (June 5, 2015). 
 266.  Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Controls and Operational Controls for High 
Hazard Flammable Trains, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,952, 71,952, 71,973 (Nov. 18, 2015). 
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contained in its May 2014 Emergency Order267—which it had appeared to 
do.268 
Seven petitions for review of the final rule were also filed in four courts 
of appeals shortly after the Tank Car Rule was finalized, after which they 
were consolidated in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit.269  As of the time of writing, these petitions have all been closed.270   
Only a few months after DOT finalized the rule, however, Congress 
passed the FAST Act,271 which made several important amendments to the 
Tank Car Rule.  The FAST Act granted most of the major changes that the 
AAR had requested in its appeals: It required DOT to prohibit the use of 
DOT-111 tank cars from carrying flammable liquids, regardless of whether 
they are transported in HHFTs; to add extra safety requirements for tank cars, 
including thermal blankets and pressure relief devices; and to lengthen and 
adjust the retrofit implementation timeline.272  Some of these requirements 
made the Tank Car Rule stricter and were in line with what environmental 
groups had requested (and perhaps what DOT itself wanted), while others 
served to make the rule less stringent.273 
Notably, the FAST Act also required the Government Accountability 
Office (“GAO”) and the National Academy of Sciences to conduct two sep-
arate studies of ECP brakes.274  (An earlier version of the bill reportedly pro-
vided for these tests to be conducted by a committee composed of the rail-
roads, before the House Transportation Committee required that the tests be 
                                                          
 267.  PHMSA Notice Regarding Emergency Response Notifications for Shipments of Petroleum 
Crude Oil by Rail, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Admin. (May 28, 2015), 
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/news/phmsa-notice-regarding-emergency-response-notifications-ship-
ments-petroleum-crude-oil-rail.  
 268.  Earthjustice, Withdrawal of Administrative Appeal of the Final Rule: “Hazardous Materi-
als: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains,” 
Docket No. PHMSA 2012-0082 (HM-251), 80 Fed. Reg. 26,644 (May 8, 2015) (June 12, 2015).  
 269.  Am. Petroleum Inst. v. United States, No. 15-1131 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  
 270.  Ass’n of Am. R.R. v. DOT, Docket No. 15-01415 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 12, 2015); Sierra Club 
v. DOT, Docket No. 15-01199 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 2015); Scenic Hudson v. DOT, Docket No. 15-
01195 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 2015); Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials, 
Docket No. 15-01194 (D.C. Cir. Jun 29, 2015); Vill. of Barrington v. TRAN, Docket No. 15-02040 
(7th Cir. May 13, 2015); Am. Short Line and Region v. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials, Docket 
No. 15-01132 (D.C. Cir. May 11, 2015). 
 271.  Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94 §§ 7304–06, 129 Stat. 
1312, 1597 (2015) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 20155). 
 272.  Id. 
 273.  See supra notes 222–227. 
 274.  Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, §§ 7301–7311; Ashley Halsey, Railroads, 
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conducted by independent experts.275)  The National Academy concluded 
that it was “unable to make a conclusive statement about the emergency per-
formance of ECP brakes relative to other braking systems,”276 while the GAO 
issued a report recommending, among other things, “that DOT acknowledge 
uncertainty in its revised economic analysis of ECP brakes.”277  Then, in De-
cember 2017, the Trump Administration announced that it would initiate a 
rulemaking to rescind the ECP brake requirement, and in September 2018, it 
finalized this rescission.278 
At least some of the ways that DOT weakened the rule during the notice-
and-comment process look less important within the context of the whole 
rulemaking process.  For example, although the requirement to adopt ECP 
brakes became somewhat less stringent from the proposed rule to the final 
rule, the fact that FRA and PHMSA included this provision at all seems more 
indicative of DOT’s resilience to interest group influence, given how fiercely 
the business community (and in particular, the railroad industry) opposed re-
quiring ECP brakes.279  Indeed, some reporting indicates that the final rule 
was tougher than expected.280  That is not to say that the changes made to the 
rule at the NPRM stage were not important.  For example, the implementation 
timeline for retrofitting existing tank cars was substantially prolonged from 
the proposed rule to the final rule stage.281  Yet even this change seems like 
a less significant concession when viewed in the context of the entire rule, as 
industry groups initially resisted imposing any retrofit requirements for ex-
isting tank cars.282 
                                                          
 275.  Halsey, supra note 274 (“One version of the bill would have entrusted the testing to a 
committee made up primarily of the railroads, but others involved in the talks insisted that the work 
be done by contractors free of conflicts of interest.  ‘The original study was going to be tainted by 
the industry, and the House [transportation] committee fixed up the bill to make it more fair,’ Risch 
recalled.” (alteration in original)). 
 276.  TRANSP. RESEARCH BD.,NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENGINEERING, & MED., A REVIEW OF 
THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION TESTING AND ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR ELECTRONICALLY 
CONTROLLED PNEUMATIC BRAKES 13 (2017). 
 277.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-122, TRAIN BRAKING DOT’S RULEMAKING 
ON ELECTRONICALLY CONTROLLED PNEUMATIC BRAKES COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL 
DATA AND TRANSPARENCY 48–49 (2016). 
 278.  Hazardous Materials: Removal of Electronically Controlled Pneumatic Brake System Re-
quirements for High Hazard Flammable Unit Trains, 83 Fed. Reg. 48,393, 48,396–97 (Sept. 25, 
2018) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 174, 179).  
 279.  See Schaper, supra note 239 (describing the railroad industry’s opposition to the ECP brake 
requirement). 
 280.  Amy Harder & Bob Tita, U.S. Lays Down Strict Railcar Rules, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2015, 
at B1. 
 281.  Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-
Hazard Flammable Trains, 80 Fed. Reg. 26,644, 26,647 (May 8, 2015) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. 
pts. 171, 172, 173, 174, 179). 
 282.  See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
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Evaluating interest group influence over the course of the whole rule 
presents a more nuanced picture than looking solely at the notice-and-com-
ment period.  It is true that businesses and industry associations appear to 
have had a greater share of the policy concerns in their comments on the 
NPRM addressed in the final rule than other kinds of interest groups; yet, 
there is no such disparity when one compares their comments on the ANPRM 
to the final rule.  In addition, the final rule is still more stringent than what 
these groups initially requested in their petitions for rulemaking in several 
respects.  Finally, although the Tank Car Rule noticeably granted AAR a 
number of important requests, many of these changes were made by Con-
gress, rather than the DOT.  Furthermore, several of these changes (such as 
requiring thermal blankets and pressure relief valves, and broadening the 
scope of the rule) served to increase the stringency of the tank car standards, 
and interviews with DOT officials suggest that at least some officials would 
have liked to include these changes in the final rule, but knew they were too 
costly to get past OIRA review.  Thus, even where business influence appears 
to be at its strongest, the outcome may not always be to weaken regulations. 
4.  Significance of Requests 
Hypothesis 4: Businesses may be more successful in part because they 
make more limited and realistic requests. 
This study finds three pieces of evidence that suggest that businesses 
and industry associations were more conservative and strategic as to the num-
ber and types of concerns that they raised about the Tank Car Rule NPRM.  
First, Table 1 shows that businesses, and to a lesser extent, industry associa-
tions, on average raised fewer policy concerns with the proposed rule than 
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Business 2.25 1.98 
Individual 4.03 1.96 
Industry  
Association 3.53 2.41 
Public Interest 5.77 4.24 
State/Local 4.03 2.97 
 
Second, Table 3 shows that businesses—and again, to a lesser extent, 
industry associations—were more focused on the “main issues” (i.e., the thir-
teen issued discussed in the preamble to the final rule) that DOT had signaled 
were within the ambit of the rulemaking process.283  Table 3 shows how many 
of the main issues in the Tank Car Rule NPRM were addressed by each main 
category of commenters on average.  The disparity between the total number 
of policy changes raised and the number of main issues addressed is smallest 
for businesses and largest for individuals. 
Third, business interests were more narrowly focused on certain parts 
of the rule than other types of interest groups and individual members of the 
public.  Figure 5 shows the proportion of each interest group’s comments that 
discuss the five most commonly cited issues, of the thirteen major issues in 
the rulemaking described above.284  An overwhelming majority of businesses 
and industry associations commented on the proposed speed restrictions, and 
no other issue received close to that same amount of attention from busi-
nesses or trade associations.285  By contrast, state and local governments, as 
well as public interest organizations, tended to be about as likely to mention 
any of the five most commonly cited issues in the proposed rule.286 
 
                                                          
 283.  All of these issues, except for three—harmonization, scope of the rulemaking, and crude 
oil treatment—were explicitly raised at the NPRM stage as well.  The results in Table 3 remain 
virtually unchanged if you exclude those issues from the analysis. 
 284.  These issues are the ones listed in the “Summary and Discussion of Public Comments” 
section of the preamble of the final rule.  See 80 Fed. Reg. at 26,661–26,714. 
 285.  See infra fig.5.   
 286.  See infra fig.5. 
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FIGURE 5: MOST COMMON SUBJECTS OF NPRM COMMENTS 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, individual commenters at first appear quite uni-
fied in their focus on the proposed rule, despite the fact that they were the 
least likely to have their requests granted by DOT during the notice-and-com-
ment period.287  Over 71% of individuals’ comments on the proposed rule 
focused in part on the timeline for implementing the tank car standards, and 
they were not nearly as likely to focus on other aspects of the rule.288  How-
ever, this is largely due to the presence of a large number of form letters.  
Excluding form letters, individual comments are much less focused on the 
timeline issue, and are more evenly divided across a larger number of issues. 
Taken together, this evidence suggests that businesses were more con-
servative and strategic in terms of the issues they raised, while individuals—
and to a lesser extent, public interest organizations and state and local gov-
ernments—adopted more of a scattershot approach, raising more concerns 
that were outside the scope of the rule and addressing more issues. 
One possible explanation for these disparities is that individuals simply 
were not aware of what issues DOT was potentially open to changing and 
which ones it was not.  However, while this may be true for individual mem-
bers of the public, it seems less plausible with regard to public interest organ-
izations, many of which are quite sophisticated.  Another possibility is that 
business interests are more focused on issues in the rulemaking that the 
agency is open to revising because they were more successful at getting those 
                                                          
 287.  See supra fig.5. 
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issues on the table at earlier stages in the rulemaking process.  In other words, 
by setting the agenda early, businesses may have been able to determine 
which issues were under consideration in the notice-and-comment phase.289  
Yet the fact that public interest organizations and the NTSB also participated 
at the earliest stages of the rulemaking process again suggests that businesses 
did not have total freedom in setting the agenda.  One last possibility is that 
individuals and public interest groups may be focused on signaling their po-
litical support for stronger regulations to the agency’s political leadership, 
instead of trying to provide nuanced analysis to the agency staff that might 
lead to technical tweaks during the notice-and-comment process.290  Thus, 
they may be raising requests that they know have a low probability of suc-
cess, but which would dramatically change the scope of the rule if they are 
successful.291 
III.  IMPLICATIONS 
At the most general level, the story of interest group participation and 
influence in the Tank Car Rule seems to fit quite well with the broader em-
pirical literature: Businesses and trade associations together were better rep-
resented than public interest groups and individuals at almost every stage of 
the rulemaking process (though public interest groups were represented at 
most stages).  Comments submitted by businesses and trade associations 
were also more likely to be associated with changes during the notice-and-
comment period than those submitted by other interest groups.  This fits with 
the recent empirical literature on interest group influence in the rulemaking 
process which finds that business interests still participate more—and exert 
more influence—than public interest groups and individual members of the 
public.292 
Yet at the same time, this study reveals a few findings that call into 
question the magnitude of business influence in the rule and suggest that we 
cannot infer from the existing evidence that businesses have captured the 
federal rulemaking process.  These findings bolster the regulatory system 
                                                          
 289.  See West & Raso, supra note 13, at 497 (“Placing an issue on an agency’s rulemaking 
agenda is important.  At a minimum, it . . . establishes the issues that will dominate subsequent 
debate.  It may also reflect a tentative determination in favor of a particular course of action.  As 
rules progress in their development, moreover, they accumulate organizational, political, and legal 
momentum that can inhibit major revisions in how problems are defined and addressed.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 290.  See Cuéllar supra note 62, at 479, 484–85. 
 291.  Id. at 485 (“While the agency staff nearly always dismisses those missives, enough of them 
can signal to the agency’s political leadership that the political costs of proceeding with a certain 
kind of regulation is greater than anticipated, and perhaps prohibitive.  But if the letters are not 
enough to pull that off, then they appear to be largely ignored by the agency staff.”). 
 292.  See supra Section I.B. 
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against two concerns associated with the regulatory capture view of the rule-
making process: that the regulatory system fails to serve the public interest, 
and that it lacks democratic legitimacy. 
A.  How Much Influence Do Businesses Have in the Rulemaking 
Process? 
This study reveals four findings that call into question the magnitude of 
business influence in this rule: First, while business interests largely pre-
sented a unified front at the proposed rule stage on the overall stringency of 
the rule, they differed on some important aspects of the rule—such as the 
stringency of new tank standards, the retrofit timeline, and the scope of the 
rule.293  In at least some of these cases, some industry groups, such as the 
AAR, even took up some of the same positions as environmental organiza-
tions, and this support appears to have resulted in a stronger rule.294  In addi-
tion, industry associations and businesses were less unified with respect to 
their positions on the ANPRM, with a substantial number of industry associ-
ations and businesses calling for the existing regulatory regime to become 
more stringent, at least in some respects.295 
Second, although the major requirements in the rule were more likely to 
shift in the direction desired by industry associations and businesses than that 
desired by public interest groups and individuals, this gap narrows when one 
looks at the proportion of specific policy concerns that were fully addressed 
in the final rule.296  Moreover, more often than not, the concerns businesses 
and other interest groups expressed in their comments were not fully ad-
dressed in the final rule.297 
Third, at least some of the concessions that business interests won dur-
ing the notice-and-comment period appear less important within the context 
of the rule as a whole.  Notably, although the final rule was less stringent than 
the proposed rule, it was still more restrictive than businesses had initially 
desired in several respects.298  In addition, when we focus on the ANPRM 
stage of the rulemaking process, state and local governments were the most 
likely to have their policy concerns in these comments addressed in the final 
rule, with businesses and industry associations less likely to be successful.299 
Finally, business interests’ comments raised more limited concerns than 
individual members of the public and public interest groups.  Businesses—
                                                          
 293.  See supra Section II.C.1. 
 294.  See supra Section II.C.1. 
 295.  See supra tbl.2. 
 296.  See supra Section II.C.2. 
 297.  See supra fig.2. 
 298.  See supra Section II.C.3. 
 299.  See supra fig.4. 
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and to a lesser extent, industry associations—raised fewer policy concerns on 
the proposed rule, commented on a more specific set of issues, and were more 
likely to focus on issues that DOT had signaled fell within the scope of the 
rulemaking.  By contrast, public interest groups and individuals tended to ask 
for more changes overall, focused on more issues, and raised more concerns 
that fell outside the scope of the proposed rule.300 
All this is not to say that businesses did not play a major role in the 
development of the Tank Car Rule.  Businesses were heavily involved 
throughout every stage of the rulemaking process, and many of the specific 
policy changes they desired were incorporated—at least to some extent—in 
the final version of the rule.301  The railroad industry in particular ultimately 
saw a number of its requests fully reflected in the rule, as amended by the 
FAST Act.302  Yet even here, it is unclear whether the railroad industry’s 
success is an indication solely of its influence, or whether it also reflects the 
fact that DOT regulators believed that several of the changes sought by the 
railroad industry would improve safety and strengthen the rule.  This latter 
interpretation accords with Professor Marissa Golden’s relatively benign 
view of business influence, that “when there is conflict rather than consensus 
among the commenters . . . the agency tends to hear most clearly the voices 
that support the agency’s position.”303 
B.  The Implications of Business Influence 
1.  The Utility of Regulations 
This Article suggests that although the recent theoretical and empirical 
literatures demonstrate that businesses wield disproportionate influence in 
the rulemaking process, the existing evidence does not substantiate the clas-
sic “capture” account of regulation, in which “government regulation reflects 
the influence of special interests, and is created and operated for their ad-
vantage.”304  To some extent, this should be heartening: It suggests, in line 
with Professor Steven Croley’s account, that our regulatory system is still 
capable of serving the public interest and addressing major social problems, 
despite the existing level of business influence.305 
That is not to deny that the current imbalances in interest group partici-
pation and influence are problematic.  To the contrary, it seems quite plausi-
ble that the current level of business influence reduces the net benefits of 
                                                          
 300.  See supra Section II.C.4. 
 301.  See supra figs.2–4. 
 302.  See supra note 273 and accompanying text. 
 303.  Golden, supra note 58, at 261. 
 304.  Levine & Forrence, supra note 8, at 169. 
 305.  See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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regulation relative to a counterfactual scenario with less business influence.  
For instance, disproportionate participation and influence may cause regula-
tors to weaken needed regulations or fail to issue regulations that would have 
promoted improved public welfare if they had been enacted.306  Professors 
Daniel Carpenter and David Moss hypothesize that the level of business in-
fluence is likely sufficient to reduce the net benefits of regulation in many 
cases, but not so great that the public would be better served by having no 
regulation.307  
Yet other scholars argue that in at least some contexts, disproportionate 
business influence may yield better regulatory outcomes.308  For instance, 
Professor Dorit Rubinstein Reiss shows that in some contexts, a close rela-
tionship between agency regulators and business can yield important bene-
fits—including better information, improved compliance, and avoidance of 
unintended consequences.309  Laurence Tai argues that designing regulatory 
processes to encourage business influence can incentivize business interests 
to provide valuable information to regulators.310 
Thus, at the very least, although one may still reasonably conclude—
based on the existing evidence—that business interests have too much influ-
ence relative to other types of interest groups and individuals, we do not know 
nearly enough to conclude, in Senator Elizabeth Warren’s words, that “our 
rulemaking process is broken from start to finish.”311 
2.  The Legitimacy of Regulations 
The conclusions presented in this Article also help to defuse a possible 
threat to the democratic legitimacy of agency rules.  Regulations’ legitimacy 
stems not only from their authorizing legislation, but also from the public’s 
meaningful participation in the rulemaking process.312  Rulemaking proce-
dures are designed to preserve this legitimacy by increasing public access and 
                                                          
 306.  Carpenter & Moss, supra note 4, at 11–12; see, e.g., Sarah Kliff, Emergency Rooms Are 
Monopolies. Patients Pay the Price, VOX (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.vox.com/health-
care/2017/12/4/16679686/emergency-room-facility-fee-monopolies (describing how the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services withdrew a proposed rule, aimed at preventing hospitals from 
inappropriately charging higher facility fees, due to industry pressure). 
 307.  Carpenter & Moss, supra note 4, at 11–12. 
 308.  See, e.g., Thaw, supra note 16; Wansley, supra note 16. 
 309.  Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, The Benefits of Capture, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569 (2012).  
 310.  Tai, supra note 16. 
 311.  Warren, supra note 6. 
 312.  See, e.g., Bull, supra note 18, at 627 (“[I]f cultivated properly, public participation can both 
enhance the quality of agency decisionmaking and imbue citizens with a sense of investedness in 
the workings of the administrative state.”); Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 13, at 100 (“Open 
government and equal access to decisionmaking processes are cornerstones that ensure an account-
able and democratically legitimate Fourth Branch.”). 
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making regulators more responsive to the public.313  These procedures in-
clude requirements that agencies maintain open records, be inclusive, and 
respond to all significant comments.314  Over the years, however, this legiti-
macy has been undercut by allegations of regulatory capture and the weight 
of the evidence showing that business interests dominate the regulatory pro-
cess and influence the development of regulations.315 
To the extent that business interests completely dominate the rulemak-
ing process or control regulatory outcomes, the legitimacy of agency rules 
would seem to be in peril.  Croley suggests that the extent to which business 
influence undermines this source of legitimacy depends on the relative im-
balance in participation among different types of interest groups,316 as well 
as on the magnitude of business influence—i.e., the extent to which business 
interests are able to achieve their desired regulatory outcomes.317  In a similar 
vein, Reeve Bull suggests that public participation must be “effective” to 
confer legitimacy on agency rules.318  Carpenter and Moss go further, arguing 
that “[t]he widespread belief that special interests capture regulation, and that 
neither the government nor the public can prevent this, understandably weak-
ens public trust in government” more generally.319 
                                                          
 313.  KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 5, at 176–89; William F. West, Formal Procedures, In-
formal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institu-
tional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66, 74 (2004) (“Conservative allegations that agencies 
were driven by their own zealotry and liberal allegations that agencies were captured by special 
(read: business) interests reinforced the ‘crisis of legitimacy’ posed by bureaucracy’s increased re-
liance on delegated legislative power.  Participation on the record was designed to counter both 
types of parochialism by ensuring transparency in the rulemaking process and by forcing agencies 
to respond to comments offered by the full range of stakeholders affected by their decisions.” (cita-
tions omitted)). 
 314.  Wagner, supra note 14, at 1323 (first citing the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 
552 (2006); and then citing Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (2006)).  
 315.  Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher & Wendy Wagner, The Enlightenment of Administrative 
Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 476–80 (2012) 
(outlining several empirical studies showing that business interests dominate the rulemaking process 
and concluding that these findings undercut the ideals of interest group pluralism in the administra-
tive process); Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 13, at 102 (“[A] number of scholars, particularly 
in the political sciences, question whether administrative processes actually provide this type of 
balanced access to and influence over the rulemaking process for all affected groups.”). 
 316.  Steven Croley, Making Rules: An Introduction, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1511, 1521 (1995) 
(“[P]articipation in rulemaking only by [representatives of regulated parties] might compromise, 
rather than advance, agencies’ political legitimacy.”) 
 317.  Id. (“To the extent that participation by regulated parties results in rules predicated on 
skewed or incomplete information strategically provided by those parties, participation exacerbates 
rather than ameliorates concerns about political legitimacy.”). 
 318.  Bull identifies several elements constituting effective participation: “(1) it should be wide-
spread, including as many citizens as practicable; (2) it should be informed; (3) it should be educa-
tional for the participating citizens; (4) it should produce information that is useful to the agency 
seeking public input; and (5) it should be conducted efficiently.”  Bull, supra note 18, at 627. 
 319.  Carpenter & Moss, supra note 4, at 2. 
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Yet the empirical literature does not show that businesses completely 
dominate the rulemaking process or control regulatory outcomes.  Although 
the literature finds that businesses disproportionately participate throughout 
the rulemaking process, it also finds that state and local governments, indi-
viduals, and public interest groups are often represented.320  Furthermore, as 
this Article shows, the literature also says little about the magnitude of busi-
ness influence and does not come close to demonstrating that business inter-
ests are routinely able to achieve their desired regulatory outcomes.  Thus, 
administrative procedures should still serve as a source of democratic legiti-
macy for regulations. 
3.  Regulatory Reform 
Finally, to the extent that policymakers are considering reforming ad-
ministrative procedures in order to further democratize the rulemaking pro-
cess, this Article provides reason to favor incremental reforms, rather than 
more radical ones.  This Article suggests that there is still much that we do 
not know about the magnitude of interest group influence in the rulemaking 
process and how this influence is affecting the functioning of our regulatory 
system.321  Given this lack of information, it seems wise to proceed with cau-
tion, rather than completely restructuring our administrative process.322 
Scholars in recent years have articulated a number of incremental re-
forms aimed at leveling the playing field, while preserving the main elements 
of our current rulemaking process.  For instance, some scholars have pro-
posed reforms aimed at overcoming individuals’ informational deficits and 
rendering their participation more effective, such as appointing “regulatory 
public defenders” to represent the general public323 or forming “citizen advi-
sory committees” composed of “small, deliberative bodies of citizens” to ad-
vise agencies on policy issues.324  Professor Wendy Wagner discusses several 
proposals for encouraging more participation from individuals and public in-
terest groups, including offering monetary prizes and publicity to individuals 
or organizations that submit “public-benefiting” comments on a complex 
                                                          
 320.  See supra Section I.B; see also CROLEY, supra note 34, at 291–92 (“[W]hile one can still 
distinguish among regulatory decisions according to the amount of public attention they generate or 
the number of outside participants they involve, few agency decisions with significant stakes escape 
public attention or participation completely.”). 
 321.  Wagner et al., supra note 13, at 152 (“There is a great deal that we do not know about the 
administrative process that we need to know to assess how well it works in advancing the goals set 
for it.”). 
 322.  See Ronald M. Levin, The REINS Act: Unbridled Impediment to Regulation, 83 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1446, 1454 (2015) (“The current rulemaking system incorporates a variety of con-
trols over potential misuses of the rulemaking process . . . . Congress should be circumspect about 
entertaining proposals for drastic changes in this system.”). 
 323.  Cuéllar, supra note 62, at 491. 
 324.  Bull, supra note 18, at 640–47. 
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rule.325  Other scholars have proposed reforms that would further insulate 
agencies against business influence, including limiting agencies’ meetings 
with outside groups and paying agency officials higher salaries to reduce the 
incentives to move to the private sector.326 
Other proposed reforms would more radically reshape our regulatory 
system.  For instance, the REINS Act would require that Congress affirma-
tively approve new major agency regulations before they could take effect.327  
There is historical precedent for concerns about regulatory capture leading to 
radical reforms to our regulatory system.  In the 1960s, for instance, scholar-
ship on regulatory capture led to “a curious two-pronged reform movement: 
pointing, on the one hand, toward deregulation and, on the other, toward a 
new wave of large-scale social and environmental regulation.”328  Although 
the contemporary scholarly literature shows that our current rulemaking pro-
cedures fall short of ensuring proportionate access and influence, its findings 
do not as yet justify comparable reforms today. 
Moreover, even if the level of business influence were sufficient to jus-
tify more radical reforms, reforms such as the REINS Act that dramatically 
increase Congressional involvement in the rulemaking process would likely 
only have the opposite effect.  Croley enumerates several ways in which ad-
ministrative procedures serve to render agencies more autonomous than 
Members of Congress and less susceptible to control by interest groups.329  
Similarly, contrary to proponents of the REINS Act,330 Coglianese and 
Scheffler examine the legislative procedures that Congress used in 2017 to 
advance two of its most important legislative initiatives, and they conclude 
that agency procedures are more transparent and inclusive than the proce-
dures used by Congress.331  Professor Cass Sunstein argues that Congress’s 
“need to focus on reelection, especially when accompanied by the sheer press 
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of time, increases the risk of influence by—and, on occasion, even near-ex-
clusive attention to—information provided by private groups with clear com-
mitments to one or another course of action.”332 
This case study supports the conclusion that agencies are less suscepti-
ble than Congress to interest group influence.  Whereas DOT resisted intense 
opposition from industry groups and retained the ECP brake requirement in 
the final rule, Congress shortly thereafter amended the rule to make the im-
position of this requirement contingent on additional testing and research 
(which in turn led to the Trump Administration’s rescinding the requirement) 
and granted the railroad industry several other changes that it had re-
quested.333   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Contrary to widespread perceptions and allegations of agency capture, 
this study shows that the existing evidence falls well short of demonstrating 
that businesses or other interest groups exert anything approaching system-
atic control over the regulatory process.  Furthermore, through exploring in-
terest group participation and influence in the context of the Tank Car Rule, 
this study suggests that even when businesses are better represented in the 
rulemaking process and receive more of their desired changes than other 
types of interest groups, their influence may be much more circumscribed 
than these factors alone would suggest.  It also shows that, at least in some 
instances, there may be important constraints on businesses that do not nec-
essarily show up when examining imbalances in interest group participation 
or high-level rule changes to rules during the notice-and-comment process.  
This in turn suggests that businesses may have less influence, and regulators 
may have more independence, than has been represented. 
Recognizing the limits of business influence in the rulemaking process 
has important implications for the utility of our regulatory system, for its le-
gitimacy, and for how this system should be reformed.  As discussed above, 
there are legitimate reasons to be concerned about the level of business influ-
ence in the rulemaking process, even if the business interests do not control 
this process.  Yet by painting an exaggerated portrait of this influence, the 
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capture account risks further undermining public trust in government and 
leading to unnecessary or unwise regulatory reforms, some of which could 
even augment business influence in the regulatory process.  The unwarranted 
perception that businesses control the rulemaking process has helped to un-
dermine public trust in regulatory agencies and has been used to justify radi-
cal reforms to the regulatory process, such as the REINS Act.334  Developing 
a better understanding of the extent and limits of business influence in the 
rulemaking process may help to rebut some of the cynicism about regulation, 
where warranted.  Where such cynicism is justified, it may help policymakers 
focus on reforms that will ensure participation by a more representative 
cross-section of interest groups and individual members of the public and 
lead to a regulatory process that better serves the public interest. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
Data Source 
The main source of data for this study is the public submissions to the 
DOT on the Tank Car Rule, along with the rule itself and the FAST Act 
amendments to the rule.  Over 400 different interest groups (including busi-
nesses, state and local governments, and non-profit organizations), along 
with an even larger number of individual members of the public, participated 
in the regulatory process for the Tank Car Rule.  Together, they submitted 
over 3300 public submissions to the DOT concerning the rule, including pe-
titions for rulemaking, comments on different versions of the rule, and ap-
peals of the final rule.  I downloaded all of the documents labeled “Public 
Submissions” from the docket folder on regulations.gov. 
Coding and Analysis 
Drawing on the work of other empirical researchers who have examined 
the role of interest groups in the rulemaking process, I developed a set of 
coding questions designed to document important characteristics of these 
groups, the positions they took on the rule, how they participated in the rule-
making process, and whether the rule ultimately reflected their desired out-
comes.  I personally coded all of the public submissions on the rule.  I cleaned 
and analyzed the data in Stata 13.1 but exported it to Excel to create all of the 
figures.  Stata code is available upon request. 
To validate my results after I had finished coding all of the submissions, 
I trained a law student in the coding methodology and he independently re-
coded a random sample of eighty-nine (approximately 2.5%) of the public 
submissions on the rule.  Thirty of these submissions were scored as non-
form letters (again approximately 2.5% of all the non-form letter submis-
sions).  I then separately computed inter-coder reliability scores first for all 
the observations and then for only the non-form letters.  For the categorical 
variables (such as the type of organization participating in the rule), I com-
puted the percent agreement.  I also computed Fleiss’s Kappa and Krippen-
dorff’s Alpha for variables which had sufficient observations.  For the con-
tinuous variables (such as the number of words in each comment), I 
computed bivariate correlations.  Following Professors Wendy Wagner, 
Katherine Barnes, and Lisa Peters, I generally only report data that have 
above 75% reliability and note in footnotes when reliability falls below this 
level.335 
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I also supplemented my analysis by conducting informal interviews (on 
the condition of maintaining anonymity) with agency staff and private stake-
holders who were involved in the rulemaking process.  They provided ex-
tremely helpful background on the development of the rule, and they helped 
me to understand some of the more technical aspects of the rule and how it 
evolved throughout the rulemaking process. 
Notes on Coding Categories 
I categorized the participants in the rulemaking using categories similar 
to those used by Wagner, Barnes, and Peters,336 Professors Jason and Susan 
Webb Yackee,337 and Professor Cary Coglianese338: Business, Industry asso-
ciation, Non-Profit/Public interest group, State/Local government, Member 
of Congress, Other federal government, Native American tribe, Individual, 
and Other.  I marked any and all categories that applied to each organization.  
For some organizations, multiple categories applied (for example, a non-
profit organization that represents local governments).  To determine how to 
categorize an organization, I looked first at how the organization describes 
itself in its submission.  If the submission does not make clear what type of 
organization it is, then I performed a simple Google search for the organiza-
tion. 
To code the form of the participation in the rulemaking, I referred to the 
description of the submission on regulations.gov and the text of the submis-
sion itself, and I compared the date it was uploaded to regulations.gov to the 
timeline of the rule.  I then examined whether the participation was asking 
for the rule to become more or less stringent overall.  If the submission pre-
dated the NPRM (for example, if it was a petition for rulemaking or a com-
ment on ANPRM), then I coded whether the participant was generally advo-
cating for the existing regulatory regime to become more or less stringent. 
I coded influence in two main ways: First, I examined whether the par-
ticipant was asking for one of the major issues in the rulemaking—as outlined 
by DOT—to become more or less stringent, and whether that part of the rule 
subsequently became more or less stringent (labeled as “Influence 1” in Fig-
ure 2).  If the submission pre-dated the NPRM (for example, if it is a petition 
for rulemaking or a comment on ANPRM), then I coded whether the partici-
pant was advocating for the existing regulatory regime to become more or 
less stringent.  To discern how the rule changed, I primarily relied on DOT’s 
discussion in the ANPRM, the NPRM, the final rule, and the amendments to 
the final rule in the FAST Act.  To corroborate my understanding of how the 
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rule evolved, I conducted informal interviews with government officials and 
private parties involved in the rulemaking process and referred to media ac-
counts of the rule. 
This method is very similar to the content analysis methodology that 
Professor Susan Webb Yackee developed and has used in numerous pa-
pers.339  However, because the rule is quite long and complex and each com-
ment involves multiple requests for change, I analyze influence at the “major 
issue” level, rather than at the rule-level, following Wagner, Barnes, and Pe-
ters340  Yet unlike Wagner, Barnes, and Peters because my study is limited to 
a single rule, I analyze the actual comment letters, rather than relying on the 
requests summarized in the preamble to the final rule.  To determine whether 
each section of the rule became more or less stringent, I drew on the summary 
of these changes in the preamble to the final rule, and particularly Table 2 in 
the final rule, which summarizes the changes to most of the major parts of 
the rule from the proposed rule stage to the final rule stage. 
Second, I attempted to estimate the proportion of policy concerns raised 
in the submission that were fully addressed in the final rule (labeled as “In-
fluence 2” in Figure 2).  This method is similar to one used by Justice 
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar,341 who recorded the total number of suggestions 
raised in each comment that were addressed by changes in the rule, along 
with whether any suggestion in the comment was addressed.  Like Cuéllar, I 
counted a policy concern as being “adopted” if “the agency makes precisely 
the change requested by a comment” or if “the agency makes a change that 
renders moot the concerns raised in the comments in question.”342  However, 
whereas Cuéllar also counted cases where the agency explicitly states in the 
final rule preamble that “a particular change was made in response to con-
cerns raised in comments like the one in question,”343 I counted such changes 
only where the agency fully adopted the commenter’s request or rendered it 
moot. 
When tallying up the number of policy concerns, I did not count com-
ments that addressed issues entirely outside the scope of the rulemaking (e.g., 
stopping fracking, taxing carbon emissions).  I also counted policy concerns 
only, not concerns with PHMSA’s analysis of the rule.  I did not code docu-
ments that commenters did not write (for example, if a commenter uploaded 
a New York Times article about the Tank Car Rule).  If someone endorsed a 
proposal written by another person or organization, then I coded that endorse-
ment only if the commenter describes the concerns addressed in that proposal 
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(for example, I did not code a comment that just says, “I support Mr. Smith’s 
concerns with the rule”).  If someone endorsed another proposal, I counted 
that as successful only if that entire proposal was adopted. 
Comments discussing how stringent the standards should be for new and 
existing tank cars often addressed a number of distinct technical sub-issues.  
Usually, these sub-issues were lumped together, but sometimes commenters 
raised them separately.  For consistency and for simplicity’s sake, I treated 
policy suggestions about tank car design standards as a single concern.  I also 
did not track whether comments were later addressed in a separate rulemak-
ing process.  For example, a number of commenters requested that PHMSA 
require that shippers come up with comprehensive oil spill response plans, a 
concern which PHMSA stated it was addressing in a separate rulemaking. 
To measure the sophistication of participants, I used a series of ques-
tions developed by Cuéllar: (1) “Did the commenter distinguish the regula-
tion from the statutory requirements?”; (2) “Did the commenter . . . indicat[e] 
an understanding of the statutory requirement?”; (3) “Did the commenter pro-
pose an explicit change in the regulation provided in the notice of proposed 
rule-making . . . ?”; (4) “Did the commenter provide at least one example or 
discrete logical argument for why the commenter’s concern should be ad-
dressed?”; and (5) “Did the commenter provide any legal, policy, or empiri-
cal background information to place the suggestions in context?”344  Very 
few comments received scores of 4 or 5 because very few commenters dis-
cussed the underlying statute, perhaps because the Tank Car Rule was a dis-
cretionary measure. 
Also, following Cuéllar, I attempted to identify as many form letters as 
possible by noting if a submission closely resembled another submission.  
Although this method was necessarily imperfect and I undoubtedly missed a 
number of form letters, I still identified over 1000 form letters (over 30% of 
the submissions in the docket).  I coded each form letter in the order in which 
they appeared in the docket. 
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